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FOREWORD 
This study was conducted by Richard T. Pratt Associates, Inc.
 
under the auspices of the Office of Housing of the Agency for
 
International Development and through financing provided by
 
the study was to develop information
this office. The purpose of 

and make recommendations relating to housing finance in the Korean
 
economy.
 
While the findings and recommendations of the report have been
 
discussed with representatives of the Government of Korea, the
 
report is not to be interpreted as an official position of either
 
the Government or of the Agency for International Development.
 
-

We hope, however, that the Government of Korea will f nd the 
report and its recommendations useful to it s it formulates 
and implements its future housing finance policies. / 
Peter M. Kimm
 
Director
 
Office of Housing
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p4 NDATICRSSU!MA~'tAND'1ND 
beset with a number of The Korean Housing Finance System is 
which both hinder its present functioning and 
threaten 
problems, 
in future periods.
its ability to provide adequate housing finance 
The major problems and sone preliminary reccanendatiOns for action 
of important consideration for areas 
are provided according to the 
housin.g finance. 
THE KOEAN ZONCtMY 
The Korean Econamy has demonstrated an impressive ability 
to 
a high rate of growth. Few countries can 
match 
r-onsistently achieve 

years during which real growth
the Korean progress of the last 15 
A number of factors favorable rate of 10% per year.has occurred at a 

a strong housing finance system exist in the
to the development of 

econay. These include:
 
substantial real 
A. 	 The econmy is consistently achieving 
base fran which financial growth, expanding the economic 

can be drawn.
resources 
as reflected by the 
Population growth has been moderatingB. 
rate of growth during the current five 
year 
1.98% annual 
rate of 1.6%during 
prcxram and the expected annual growth 
the coming fourth five year plan. 
to be a highly developed cultural pattern C. Saving seems 
Private savings as a percent of in the country of Y"orea. 
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gross national product has increased 13% per year for the 
oast five years and currently represents 14.3% of gross 
national product, a figure comparable to the savings rate 
in the United States. 
exists for housing capital. 	 The averageD. Stbstantial demand 
annual increase in housing investment was 35.5% per year 
during the past five year economic plan. 
are many positive factors operating in the economy,While there 
These includeand negative influences also exist.substantial problems 
the following: 
The high growth rate of the econany has been accompaniedA. 
hasby rapid inflation. Double 	digit inflation in Korea 
and inflation reached 25% perbeen ccmmon for many years, 
The cost of building materials year fram 1973 through 1975. 
has risen faster than general prices in the economy.
 
The monetary policy of the government of Korea is completelyB. 
The annual national deficitintegrated with fiscal policy. 
directly by the Bank of Korea and governmentis financed 
into the credit markets by thefiscal policy is extended 
practice of making low interest loans to favored economic 
fiscal policy approachsectors. This comprehensive monetary 
to credit markets makes it impossible for housing finance 
institutions to operate independently in the market. Their 
ability to capture resources is a function of their persua­
siveness with government planners rather than the demand 
-2­
-or funds 	 in the housing sector. 
program 	of using inflation,C. 	 (overnment policy includes a 

source of revenue
caused by monetary growth, as a major 
through 1975,for the goverruet. During the period of 1970 
the money supply has increased at an average annual rate 
of 31%, more than double the real rate of growth in the 
an effective source of financialeconomy. 	 This provides 
to the central goverrment, but injects substantial resources 
and causes interest rates toinflation into the econcny 
be high. An economy characterized by interest rates in 
to the use of long termis not conducivethe 15%-25% range 

fixed rate mortgages.
 
It is both inappropriate and beyond the scope of this report 
econcmy.
to suggest 	major changes in the functioning of the Korean 
Nevertheless, because of its important effect on housing finance,
 
It is suggested that the govern­goverrment policy cannot be ignored. 
into account 
ment of Korea consider developing a budget which takes 
spending decisions which are contained within the implicit revenue and 
the nation's monetary policy. Inflation levels of 20% per 
year transfers
 
spending power to the governent equal to approximately 20% 
of the 
Much of the spending power raised throughnation's money supply. 
the practice of inflation is distributed as subsidies to favored 
econcmic sectors. The magnitude of these interest rate subsidies 
involved 
nor monitored by the government. The transfers 
.isnot 	reported 
a major economic magnitude. The goverment would be operating are of 
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flows were explicitly taken 
with more and better information if these 
into account. 
RATES IN THE KOREAN ECONOWYINrEREST 
The Korean econamy is presently characterized by a mixture of 
at the one extreme are almost completely goverrnentcredit markets which 
at the other extreme,interest rates, andcontrolled with specified 
set in credit markets that are ccnpletely free and unfettered are 
financialand exist outside of all formal fram goverrment regulations 

area of setting and
number of problems exist in theinstitutions. A 

including the following:
administering interest rates, 
interest rates 
A. 	 Inasmuch as the goverrment has chosen to use 
subsidy in the economy, formal credit as a direct tool of 
according to need 
markets do not effectively allocate funds 

in each sector.
or effective demand 
B. 	 Because of the oroliferation of government controls, 
it 
needs and is not infrequent that different borrowers 	whose 
are borrowingare similar and whoeconomic circumstances 
find themselves paying substantiallyfor identical purposes 
their loans, based upon thedifferent interest rates for 
program under
of funds and the politically determined source 

which the loan falls.
 
of the formal credit market,Because of the ineffectivenessC. 
a major portion of private business financing has been driven 
into the informal market (curb market). Because this 	market 
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is more risky and less well organized, interest rates are 
higher than they would be had these transactions been allowed 
to take place in a formal institutional setting. 
firms in the KoreanD. 	 Market interest rates for high quality 
economy would likely fall in the range of 15%-25% in the 
absence of cioverrzmnt intervention. Because of government 
at a 	much lc'rr rate, forcontrols setting interest rates 
example, 8%-15% on mortgages, the interest rate policy results 
The subsidies not allocatedin massive subsidies. are on 
little monitoring of who ultimatelya rational basis. There is 
receives the subsidies or what the effect of them is. 
use 	of interest rate subsidies has an unfortunate effectE. 	 The 
in a capital short, rapidly growing country like Korea. 
When a subsidy is given through the interest rate, the amount 
becomes directly proportionate to the size of the loan. 
Each industry and credit recipient of a low interest rate 
loan 	has an incentive to borrow the maximum amount of funds. 
This results in a tendency for the extravagant use of capital 
rather than its careful conservation, as would be indicated
 
by econcmic circumstances. 
of the general economy of Korea, suggestionsAs in the case 
are somewhat beyond the scopeon the national interest rate policy 
as they inpact housing financeof this report. However, inasmuch 
it would be improper to ignore them. Therefore,so extensively, 
the 	following suggestions are made: 
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The Bank of Korea and the monetary board should carefullyA. 
evaluate 	the present structure of interest rates existing 
the country for the purpose of determining whether orin 
system of control is warranted or not such an extensive 
rate on a certainWhere a controlled interestbeneficial. 
too critical to national intereft,type of loan does not seem 
or setting limits within which itdecontrol of that rate 

freely vrary should be considered.
can 
the 	controlled interestB. 	 The implicit subsidy involved in 

for by the Ministr
should be measured and accountedrates 
The subsidy amount, which is the differenceof Finance. 
rate and the subsidized ratebetween the appropriate market 
offered, should be reflected in the budgetary process. 
rates tends to encourageC. 	 Because subsidization of interest 
the use of capital, careful consideration should be given 
as many interest rate subsidies to specificto switching 
If a subsidy were switched won subsidies as is possible. 
to a specific won amunt,fram the interest rate variety 
forced to borrow at marketand 	 the subsidized entity were 
rates, incentives for the conservation of capital would 
be 	greatly improved. 
a careful study of theD. 	 The Ministry of Finance should make 
operation of the curb market for the purpose of determining 
what terms and conditions on deposits would be required 
to move a substantial portion 8f the financial activity 
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in the informal financial market into formal financial 
oninstitutions. Present unrealistic limitations deposit 
and loan rates do not effectively control the national al-
They serve only to drive credit intolocation of credit. 
infornalthe unregulated, high risk, high interest rate, 
markets.
 
THE KOREAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
by the MinistryThe Korean financial system is presided over 
of Finance with policy direction caming fram the Econcmic Planning 
banks occurring throughBoard and daily supervision of the commercial 
the Bank of Korea. A number of factors existing in the Korean financial 
system cause it to be less effective than desired as the assembler 
lender of the nation's private funds. Some of the importantand 
factors are:
 
to exist, both within the nation'sseemsA. 	 A general opinion 
the Bank of Korea and its system of ccarrcialcentral bank, 
banks that mortgage loans are a type of non-productive consumer 
credit as opposed to loans to industry, which are perceived 
As a result of this, cannercialto be for production purposes. 

banks have never been encouraged to make mortgage loans.
 
B. In addition to the philosophical aversion to mortgage loans, 
camTercial banks have lending opportunities which involve 
higher rates of interest and shorter maturities than have 
been available in the residential mortgage market. 
-7­
and other non-bank 	financialC. 	 The life insurance canpanies 
are not highly developed in the Korean econcmy,intermediaries 
sourcea substantial potentialand therefore do not provide 

of mortgage credit.
 
in the overall functioning of Some relatively modest changes 
increase system's 	effectiveness Korea's financial institutions would 
Recommendations 
as a supporter of the nation's mortgage markets. 
include: 
A. 	 Deregulation of at least limited categories of 
deposits 
that the financial institutions may effectivelyand loans so 
are presently not beingcampete for private funds which 

captured within the formal financial system.
 
the economic effec­to demonstrateB. An educational 	program 
generating
tiveness of residential mortgage lending in 
and inccme in the Korean economy. Such a campaignemployment 
the ability of residential constructionshould focus on 
fact that residential to employ relatively unskilled labor, the 
construction uses danestically produced goods rather than 
and the induced employment and income which imported goods, 
the result of multiplier effects.is generated as 
banks againston ccmrercialC. The 	proscription presently placed 
making 	 land development and construction loans should be 
or modified, to allow caimercial banks to participateremoved 
is ,ell 	suitedConstruction lendingin construction lending. 
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to normal bank lending. These loans tend to be relatively short 
term, self liquidating ni are caxmble of bearing relatively 
high interest rates. 
D. 	 The Ministry of Finance in conjunction with the caorcial 
banking industry and the Housing Bank of Korea should carefully 
explore the possibility of developing a standardized mortgage 
instrument on which the nationwide city banks and the local 
banks could originate and service residential mortgages. 
In order to encourage commercial banks to make such mortgages, 
which may not appear to them to be appropriate for their 
portfolio of assets, a secondary market could be developed 
which would allow the mortgage loans to be sold to the 
Korea Housing Bank. This would greatly increase the avail­
ability of institutions making mortgage loans. A commercial 
bank could make a construction loan followed by the permanent 
mortgage loan, which was then sold to the Korea Housing Bank. 
THE KORFA HCUSING BANK 
The Korean Housing Bank is the only financial institution charged 
with the responsibility of assembling and disbursing funds for mortgage 
lending in Korea. A nunber of recommendations are presented designed 
to increase the effectiveness of primary mortgage lending institutions. 
A. 	 The Ministry of Finance should conduct a study to determine 
if the nation's housing finance needs can be adequately 
served by the Korean Housing Bank as it is presently conceived 
and operated. Two questions appear highly important in this 
-9­
First, should the Korean Housing Bank remainregard. as
 
should its role
 a retail mortgage lender in the nation or 
a wholesale lender with the developmentbe changed to that of 

institutions. A third
of savings and loan type lending 

the Korean Housing Bank serving as both the
alternative, 
This alter­
wholesale and retail lender should also be examined. 

involve the bank remaining in retail lending
native would 

while at the same tim conducting a secondary market in
 
mortgages originated by others. 
B. The bank presently has a multitude of savings deposits which 
are offered to the public. It appears that the number of 
is large as to cause confusion and to accounts offered so 
dilute the bank's ability to prcmote any one of these types 
that the bank considerIt is reccmrendedof accounts. 
few basic accounts:structure into asimplifying its deposit 
passbook savings accounts withdrawablechecking accounts, 

upon demand, and time certificates of depos*.t with interest
 
rates appropriate to the maturity of the account.
 
The Korean Housing Bank has had difficulty in attracting
C. 
result of the low market interestdeposits in recent years as a 
rates which are offered by the institution. Either the 
as to the interestbank should be given additional discretion 
rates which it offers or the monetary board working jointly 
with all banks should consider restructuring interest rates 
upward so as to increase the portion of private savings 
-10­
which are channeled through the formal financial sector. 
D. 	 The role of national housing bonds as a source of funds 
to the Korean Housing Bank should be reevaluated. In recent 
years, the bank has became heavily dependent upon these 
funds as a source of low cost money. Several problems are 
basically associated with the national housing bonds, including: 
1. 	 The bonds represent a form of tax and are only purchased 
on a ccmpulsory basis. The supply of funds fran this 
source can only e expanded by extending the group who 
are compelled to buy the bonds or by increasing the 
amount of bonds which must be purchased by the ccnpulsory 
purchasers. 
2. 	 In the absence of a major increase in requirements for 
the purc,.iase of housing bonds, the long run growth of 
funds fran this source would be limited to the general 
expansion of economic activity which involves compulsory 
purchase. 
in 	1978, the first issue of five year maturity3. 	 Beginning 
bonds must be repaid. In each subsequent year the cash 
requirements for repayments will represent a significant 
portion of the new issues with only approximately 30% 
of the gross issues representing a net increase in housing 
funds. 
4. National housing bonds represent a form of tax while 
-11­
a subsidy.the funds supplied providethe loans mde fra 
as to why
to have been no rationale developedThere appears 
to 
wealth should be transferred from bond pirchasers 
mortgage borraers. 
a careful 
It is reccaended that the Korean Housing 
Bank make 
study of the expected funds' availability 
from national housing bonds 
and this study pay careful attention to the implication for the bank's 
national housing bonds play a reduced role in an cost structure as 

expanded mortgage finance system.
 
E. It isreccmerded that the Korean Housing Bank stop the
 
of funds to specificsourcespractice of tying specific 
an irrational al­loans. The present practice results in 
location of credit and substantial inequity in the way various 
in similar economic and social are treated who areborrowers 

circumstances.
 
loans at interestThe bank's practice of making mortgageF. 
rates4%to approximately 15%, 
rates currently ranging from 
has helped assure 
which are substantially below market rates, 
Bank has providedThe Housing 
a chronic shortage of mortgage funds. 
a very small portion of the total housing 
investment amounting 
to 
to only about 14% of the total during the 
period of 1967 
1972.
 
The Korean Housing Bank offers a wide variety 
of mortgage 
G. 
As a general
loans of various terms and interest rates. 

rule, there is no rationale between the type 
of loan offered
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and incame or financial need of the Archaser. 	 1u types 
of problems present themselves. First, if there 	are two 
families which are in similar economic circumstances, 
one may receive an interest rate of 8%while another receives 
an interest rate of 14%, because the loans came from separate 
sources. Second, a household which is in a superior position 
financially may receive a larger subsidy than a household 
with greater financial need. For example, a household bor­
rowing for a 15 pyong unit would receive a larger loan and 
therefore, a larger subsidy than a family borrowing for 
a 10 pyong unit. The Korean Housing Bank should restructure 
its loan interest rates and terms on other criteria than 
the source of funds. If interest rates for different loans 
are to be maintained rates should be consistent with the 
nation's general public policy concerning incame 	distribution. 
H. The mortgage loans of the Korean Housing Bank have the same 
problem 	as other subsidized loans in the country. The 
as muchsubsidized loans provide an incentive to borrow 
capital as is possible and in same cases may result in Korean 
Housing Bank funds being arbitraged into higher yielding 
investments instead of being used for housing purposes. 
If the Korean Housing Bank is to continue to be 	a conduit 
for housing subsidies, studies should be conducted to determine 
alternative means other than interest rates for providing 
housing subsidies. For example, a one time housing subsidy 
might be granted to the hate purchaser at the time he acquired 
-13­
With the subsidy determined by the household' sthe hare. 
personal financial circumstances and not tied to the size 
of the mortgage loan. The household would then have incentive 
to conserve capital and minimize the needed size of the 
mortgage loan. 
I. 	 The present practice of making below market interest rate 
loans has serious implications for the future operations 
of the Bank. The Bank is presently making loans of 15 to 
25 years at interest rates well below cost of funds available 
in the open market. At the same time is is obtaining shorter 
term low cost funds from the government and fran compulsory 
sources such as the five year maturity national housing 
bonds. The present practice of long term low interest rate 
lending requires that low cost funds be available not only 
at the time the loan is made but throughout its life. This 
sources of funds berequires that the present low cost 
a similar low cost nature. Itreplaced with other funds of 
not clear that such funds will continue to be availableis 
or that it would be desirable to allocate them to this use 
in the future. It is not a desirable practice to use a subsidy 
system which places requirements on future operations and 
the ability of the Housing Bank to operate successfullycamprcmises 
in future tire periods. As in earlier reccmmendations, it 
is suggested that the bank carefully explore ways of either 
eliminating subsidies, including them at the tire of the 
loan origination, or as a third alternative, finding long term 
-14­
sources of low cost money, an unlikely prospect. 
J. 	 The problens of establishing a stable self supporting housing 
finance system in Korea are exacerbated by the present practice 
of the Korea Housing Bank in making 15, 20, and 25 year mortgage 
loans on a fixed interest rate basis. The long term mortgage 
plus the high rate of inflation have cambined to sharply reduce 
the real recovery of financial resources fran mortgage borrowers. 
Under conservative assumptions, Korea has had a rate of inflation 
of at least 20% per year for the past several years. With this 
rate of inflation, and an interest rate of 8%, charged on a 
20 year loan, the repayments received fram the loan will only 
refinance about 49% of a new housing unit, so about half of 
the housing finance stock is lost in each round of lending. 
The risks inherent in the short term borroing, long term lending 
presently engaged in by the hcusing bank should be reevaluated. 
The housing bank should investigate the feasibility of using 
renegotiable mortgages of 3 to 5 years. The samewhat more 
involved processes involved in formal irdexation should be 
explored. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The reccmmerdations contained in this study should be viewed as 
areas of exploration for the government of Korea. The short period 
of time which the investigators had to examine housing finance and 
familiarize themselves with the political and institutional structure 
of the country requires that the reccamndations be viewed as apparent 
-15­
At the same time,possibilities for improving the system. the 
rather specific operating recam­investigators chose to make sane 
the hopes that this would provide a focus for thosemendations in 
who iculd be charged with making improvements in the housing finance 
in which
system. The examination of the social and legal framework 
must be evaluated and implemented was beyond thethe reccmendations 
The actual implication of desirable recommendations scope of this paper. 
must care from within the country of Korea itself and will require
 
the part of the housing finance task force repre­substantial effort on 
area.
senting the various entities and interests in the housing finance 
It is hoped that the recommendations contained in this report will 
for the work of that task force.provide a beginning structure 
-16­
The Korean Economy
 
The Korean economy has grown at a high rate for many
 
years, having achieved a growth rate of 27.2% per year
 
over the past 15 years and 28.5% over the past 5 years
 
(Table 1). Inflation has also been high, at 16.7% per
 
year since 1960 and 17.0% per year since 1970, as calculated
 
from the GNP deflator (Table 2).
 
The real growth of the economy, after removing the
 
effect of inflation is impressive. In 1970 constant prices,
 
GNP grew 10% per year over the past 15 years and 9.8% over
 
the last 5 years (Table 3).
 
The relatively high level of inflation has been accom­
panied by a government policy of expanding the money supply
 
faster than the rate of real economic growth. During the
 
period 1970-1975 money has expanded at an annual rate of
 
31% (Table 4), roughly consistent with the real growth
 
(9.8%) plus the rate of inflation as measured by the
rate 

In 1976, the government plans to
GNP deflator (17.1%). 

expand money by 25% with an expected economic growth rate
 
of approximately 12%. To the extent that excess money creation
 
results in inflation, the monetary policy serves as a form
 
The fourth five year
of taxation on those holding money. 

plan calls for a moderation in the money supply growth
 
with an expansion of the money supply of under 20% per
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year through 1981.
 
The demonstrated ability of the Korean economy 
to
 
consistently achieve a high rate of growth 
is impressive.
 
Few countries can match the Korean progress 
of the past
 
a favorable
 
two decades. The strength of the economy 
is 

factor for the development of adequate 
housing finance.
 
As incomes rise, households' ability to 
save increases
 
and the probability of developing successful 
housing finance
 
institutions improves.
 
Population Growth and GNP
 
The population of Korea which stands at 
35 million
 
(Table 5). Growth
 
people has grown 2.2% per year since 1960 

has slowed in the last five years as reflected 
in the 5
 
year annual growth rate of 1.98%, but experienced 
a sharp
 
The overall trend
 increase in 1975 when it grew 3.7%. 

is expected to continue, reducing population 
growth to
 
(Appendix IV). Real
 1.60% per year for the next 5 years 

per year since 1960
 GNP growth per capita has been 6.7% 

and 7.6% per year for the last 5 years (Table 6), 
reflecting
 
the simultaneous acceleration of GNP and slowing 
of population
 
Korean economic planners expect continued 
growth

growth. 

of over 7% per year in per capita GNP through 
198.1.
 
As a result of the urban trend to nuclear families,
 
annual household income deflated by the consumer 
price
 
index, perhaps a better measure of housing purchasing 
power,
 
fast as per capita GNP, increasing 2.2
 has not risen as 
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(Table 7).
percent per year over the past 5 years 

Inflation
 
As might be expected in a rapidly growing economy
 
characterized by aggressive money supply expansion, double
 
digit inflation has been common in Korea for many years.
 
This was compounded in recent years by the increase in
 
the price of oil and general world wide inflation causing
 
the average annual rate of inflation to exceed 25% from
 
The result has been sharp
1973 through 1975 (Table 2). 

The Consumer Price Index (Table 8)
increases in prices. 

a 15.12% per year increase
 now stands at 202.2 (1970 = 100) 

since 1970 with Building Materials Price Index (Table 9)
 
slightly higher at 207.1 and price of housing in cities
 
an annual 5 year increase of 15.7%
 at 161.7 (Table 10), 

and 10.1% respectively.
 
Private Savings
 
To a large extent the ultimate feasibility of developing
 
well-functioning housing finance institutions depends on
 
the capacity of the economy to generate private savings.
 
The savings ethic seems to be well developed in Korea,
 
Private domestic
 even among relatively low income groups. 

(Table

savings have increased nearly 40% per year since 1970 

11) and over this same period of time an ever increasing
 
proportion of national income has been devoted to savings.
 
Savings as a percentage of gross national product has in­
creased at an approximate rate of 13% per year for the
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past five years (Table 12) and currently represents 14.3%
 
In recent years, savings as
of gross national product. 

a percentage of GNP has been as high as 17.5% which occurred
 
in 1973. The ability to generate savings in the Korean
 
economy is impressive when it is recognized that in 1975
 
Korea's private savings compared favorably with the U.S.
 
level in recent years.
 
Given the
A demonstrated ability to save exists. 

substantial level of savings, an important consideration
 
becomes that of what set of financial institutions and
 
instruments would effectively direct the savings in the
 
housing investment area.
 
Capital Investment
 
Some indication of the priority which housing has
 
received in private and public spending can be determined
 
from examining the capital investment patterns in Korea.
 
shows the breakdown
Table 13, a summary of Table 14, 

of capital investment in Korea for the year 1975 as well
 
as the most recent five-year annual growth rate of each
 
As the table shows, gross
of the investment components. 

of the nation's
domestic capital investment amounts to 27% 

gross national product, with one sixth of the capital
 
Evidence seems
investment occurring in the housing area. 

to indicate that housing has not been a high priority
 
item in the last five year economic program. Nevertheless,
 
the table shows that the average annual increase in housing
 
-20­
investment was very high at 35.5% per year, exceeded only
 
by rate of inventory accumulation and investment in trans­
portation equipment.
 
Table 13
 
Capital Investment
 
% Gross Domestic 5 Year Growth
 
% GNP Capital Investment Annual Rate
 
1975 1975 1970-1975
 
Gross Dom. Cap. Inv. 27.0 100 28.6
 
Dwellings 4.4 16
 
Non-Residential Bldgs. 4.4 16 23.7
 
5.3 19 20.5
Other Construction 

Transport Equipment 5.3 19 37.3
 
Machinery 6.3 23 33.2
 
1.6 6 49.5 (LR)
Increase in Stocks 

Source: Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, September 1976, pg. 128.
 
In the fourth five year plan, investment in housing
 
appears to have even less of a priority (Appendix I).
 
Real growth of investment in dwellings will be only 4.43%
 
while real growth of investment in all other categories
 
will be 8 to 9 percent. Investment in housing is expected
 
to decline both as a percent of GNP and as a percent of
 
Gross Domestic Capital Formation in the next five years.
 
In spite of the rapid growth in housing investment,
 
the need for housing has increased more rapidly than the
 
supply. From 1960 to 1975, the nation's population increased
 
at an annual rate of 2.2%, however, this figure does not
 
-21­
The trend
accurately reflect the chane in housing needs. 

toward the nuclear family has reduced household size and
 
as a result, households have increased at 2.9% over the
 
same 15 year period, housing
15 year period. During the 

stocks grew at only 2.3 percent per year. The growing
 
housing shortage, compounded by the present policy of de­
stroying squatter settlements, is more severe in urban
 
same 15 year period, population and
areas where, over the 

number of households has grown at an annual rate of 6.0%
 
and 6.7% respectively while housing stock has grown at
 
a rate of only 5.2% per year.
 
Some elements of the Korean economy are not well suited
 
to the use of long term fixed rate mortgages. The 15-20%
 
rate of inflation and the associated high interest rates
 
which have existed in recent years have injected a high
 
level of subsidy into fixed rate mortgages which have interest
 
rates of 8-15%. When the cost of funds may be 20% and
 
money is lent at 8% the lender is subsidizing the borrower
 
12% per year over the life of the contract. At the same
at 

time these high rates of inflation hinder the development
 
of a healthy housing finance system which traditionally
 
operates on the basis of acquiring short term funds and
 
The inflation experienced
lending them on a long term basis. 

during the past five years has made it difficult to assemble
 
investment funds for long term fixed rate mortgage investments.
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1960 26 23 . 0 1 !65 977 
O=CS$ N&Y!Oh.AL PROUCT IN CUR'4ENT PRICES 6?1Lt.ION WON)
 
19: 161 1962 1963 1964 1965 966 1967 1966 1969 1970 .971 197? 1973 1974 
196 20.
 
"19A2 ., 17.4 
1963 25.6 28.2 40.9 
198' 29.8 33.i 41.7 43.3 
1965 26.7 28.3 32.2 27.4 15.0 
1976 27.0 28.3 31.2 28.3 21.4 28.2 
1967 26. 27. 29. 7 26.0 22.0 25.6 23.0 
1978 26.3 27.2 28.9 25.7 22.9 25.7 24.4 25 8 
1969 26.8 27.6 29.1 27.3 24.3 26.8 26.3 28.0 30.3 
1970 26.5 27.2 28.5 26,.9 24.4 26.3 25.8 26.8 27.3 24.4 
1971 26.1 26.6 27.7 26.2 24.0 25.5 25.0 25.5 25.4 23.0 21.7 
1972 25.6 26.3 27.2 25.8 23.8 25.1 24.6 24.9 24.7 22.9 22.1 22.5 
1073 25.? 26.4 27.2 26.0 24.2 25.4 25.0 25.4 25.3 24.0 23.9 25.1 27,7 
1974 26.7 27.2 28.0 27.0 25.5 26.7 26.5 27.0 27.2 26.6 27.2 29;1 32,5 37.5 
1975 27.2 27.7 28.5 27.6 26.2 27.4 27.3 27.9 28.2 27.8 28.5 30:3 33.0 35.7 33.9 
12OSS %JIONAL P=OOUC 
T 
IN CJARENT PPICES (BILLION WON)
 
1901 246.34 1066 1032.45 1971 3151.55 
19'4. 297.V8 1967 1269,95 1972 3860,00 
1962 3dP.q 1968 1598.04 1973 4928.57 
1963 4e11.54 1969 2081.52 1974 6779.11 
0 6A 700.20 .970 2589.26 1975 9060.33 
1965 805.3?
 
Source: Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
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TABLE 3
 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
 
1970 CONSTANT MARKET PRICES
 
c2 
190 
165 YEARS 
1;70 
I; 6Z 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1.966 
1Q67 .968 1969 1970 1971 19'2 1973 
1974 
1961 4.7 
1962 0 3.3 
490 5.5 6.0 8. 
'Q.4 6.3 8S.7 a.6 
.00 6.2 6.6 7.e 7.3 
6.1 
1.966 7.2 7.8 8.9 0.0 
9.2 12.4 
1967 , .3 7.8 8.7 P.7 
8.7 10.1 7.8 
.969 8.0 8.5 9.3 9.5 
9.7 10.9 10.2 12.6 
1969 
1970 
e.7 
6.6 
9.3 
9.1 
10.1 
9.9 
10.4 
1[0.0 
10.7 
10.2 
11.9 
11,.1 
11.8 
10,S 
13.8 
1.,8 
15.0 
1 . 
,4 7.9 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
IQ75 
V.7 
8.5 
9.1 
9.1 
9.C 
9.1 
8.9 
9.5 
9.5 
9.3 
9.P 
9.5 
.0.1 
1o. P 
9.F 
9.9 
9.6 
10.2 
10.1 
9.9 
10.1 
9.7 
10.4 
10.2 
10.0 
10.8 
10.2 
11.0 
10.7 
:0.4 
10.5 
9.9 
10.8 
10.5 
10.2 
11.1 
10.3 
11.3 
10.9 
10.5 
10.6 
9.7 
11.0 
10,6 
!0.2 
8.5 
8.0 
4-0.1 
9.6 
9.5 
9.2 
8.1 
10.8 
10.2 
9.8 
7.0 
11.6 
.0.6 
9.9 
16.5 
12.5 
10.9 
6.6 
8.3 7.9 
C.POSS NATIONAL DOIDUCr AT 1;70 CONSTA4 
,ARKET PRICES (9ILLI1N WON) 
3023.63 
1972 
 226.82
1971 3022.7119.18 1Q72
1966 1953.01
1120.72 3625,50
1460 1967 4973 4129.32
A12.43 2087.12 1975
Ice.! 2589,2 1974 3129.30
 !96! 7C2 29409
e00.49
1 1220.081C47 1oe7 

97
2S8926 
o :97E1''2 ,€9
1 r64 
Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank 
of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
 
Source: 

TABLE 4
MnNFEY SUPPLY 
S101975 171965
1960 YEAR5 
973 19741972 

io6o 1961 1962 1963 1964 1 q6 5 
1966 1967 1966 .969 

1961 57 .7 
1970 1071 
10.1196Z 31.7 
8.2 6.31063 22.' 
11. 4 16.711.0 

1945 73.6 16.3 18.5 25.1 34.2
 
1Qt4 21.1 
29.726.6 31.9le.9 21.21966 24.f 
44.5
36.0 36.9
2S.t 30.9
i967 27.3 22.8 
44.6 44.633.5 30.1 39.525.7 28.6 

1969 30.7 

1965 29.4 
27.6 30. 4 34.9 38.8 40.0 43.6 
43.1 41.7 
22.133.7 31.536.2 37.932.9 35.927.0 29.31970 29.8 
19.2 16.4
30.6 26.3
32.9 32.7 33.3
25.9 27.5 30.8
1971 28. 

29.9 45.1
30.7 27.3
34.4 35.2 33.4
32.3 34.4
27.5 29.4
1972 29.8 
 40.6
33.4 42.8
32.6 30.5
35.2 35.9 34.6
33.1 35.0
28.6 30.4
1973 30.6 
 34.9 29.
30.3 32.4 38.2
35.1 33.8 32.1
34.5 34,5
30.3 32.6
1974 30.5 28.6 
 27.2 25.0
34.8 31.5
29.4 30.'
32.7 31.133.5 34.029.9 32.1 33.61975 30.1 2F.4 

wCIEY SUPPLY (ILLION 
WON)
 398,00
1071

.96685 10 919.4027.70 10729A0 123.001967 730.30
35.40 1973
1961 177.90
1968 949.70
39.40 1974
1962 252.00
1969 1161.70
41.90 1975
103 307.60
1;70
40.90

.,464 
 65.6C1965 
Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
Source: 

TABLE 5
 
DOPLIL9T 1flN 
I-I
 
a 
192 1970 1972 19'I 1976
 
YEARS 
1974

I;b8 1969 197C 1971 1972 1973 

1969 1.9
 
1070 ;.1 2.3
 
1.971 1.;, 1.8 1.3 
. ,7 1.! 1.7
.972 

1.7 1.719?3 1.8 1.7 1.5 

1.7
1.6 1.7 1.7 
1974 1.7 1.7 

2.7 3.7
1975 2.0 2.0 2.C 2.2 2.3 

tiOUSAND$1
POPULXTICK 

.974 33459.00
1971 31828.00 

.068 30731.00 1972 32360.00 1975 34661.00
 
1973 

1066 30171.00 

32905.00
31435.00
1970 

Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
Source: 
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TABLE 6
 
FER CP-TA GNF' 
1970 PRICES
 
C,4 
17
 
0I 
I971974197219,019E 
YEARS
Is' 

.€.
:0" o.: 
: .7 e . t 7.A 
A.5 5.21Q72 7., 6.2 

Ic;39 :. 6.2 9.8
9.. 1.,.6
 
11 6. A. 
,,e.7 7.€ F.W P.6 

b.' 4.!b.: 7.3 7.h 7.O ,.F 
IHF CAPI'& (iP &(r' .97C PP:CES 
1t4,33!97,4
68.82 
.971 .97. 11 ,fl7
.97I: 

93.44 

Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
Source: 
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TABLE -7
~ ~ 
S:A AA 
....-.. ....... .. ... ...... 
-S.. 
1;q.7C i1.71 l7 i317 
iC 4 
.5 3. 2 , 1 2.6 Z.1 
1974 21 :4 -1.1 -52 
197c 2 .f 2.1 2. 1. 4 1.0s 0 5.6 
At.f.UAL 6iOUSEI-D 1'CCE DEFLATeO BY THE cCNsuioER PPICE INDEX (TNOUSAND WON) 
1' Z54 .79 1971 402,'42 1974 
37'6 .10 1972 411',97 1975 
19, ~ 8.2A 1973 424 .87 
Source: Monthly Economic Statistics, 'Bank of Korea,' 9/75 and 9/76 
402.57 
426 ;99 
I 
I.i 
Si 
i 
, 
TABLE 8
 
INnEX
CONSUMER PRICE 

1960 
lotr 1961 jQto,. 63 
19 6 5 
1964 1q65 
YEA S9 
1966 1967 1968 1969 
7 0 
q 70 
4 
1' $ 
9 2 
1972 
I 7 
1'3 
1 9 7 4 
197' 
S,, 7.1 6.5 
1963 2..6 13.3 2C.7 
1Q6= 2=.P 1f,5 25.C 29.5 
jq 5 15.3 17.3 21.1 2!.3 13.6 
:q6 :.? 16.2 iA. 
7 18.1 12.8 12.0 
1967 14., 15.3 17.1 16.2 12.1 
11.4 
1o98 13.e 14.7 16:1 
15.2 11.9 11.3 
-969 13.' 1'.1 15.2 14:3 -1.5 -1.0 
1970 13.3 13.9 14.9 14.1 
- 117 11.4 
1971 13.2 13.6 146 
13.9 11.8 11.5 
1972 13.1 13.6 14:3 
13.7 11.8 11,6 
1973 12.3 12.7 -3.3 
12.6 10.8 10.5 
1974 13.1 13.5 14.1 
13;5 12.0 11.9 
1075 13.0 14'4 15.0 
1'.5 13.3 13.2 
10.9 
11.0 
10.7 
11.2 
11.4 
11.5 
10.3 
11.8 
13.4 
11.2 
10:6 
11.3 
11.6 
11.6 
10.2 
12.0 
13,7 
10.0 
11.4 
11.7 
11.7 
9.9 
12.1 
14.0 
12.7 
12.5 
12.3 
9.9 
12.5 
14.7 
12.3 
12.1 
9.0 
12.5 
15.1 
11.5 
7;4 
12.5 
Me6 
3.1 
12.9 
17.2 
23.6 
25.0 26.3 
1,60 
1;64 
CeStivE:R 
1001966 
19130.C0 
PRICE 11fEX 
2.00 
3 .70 
5-.4n 
(19700100) 
1967 
19681C96969701 70 
65;4 
72;50 
80.60 
60160,10 
4 
1971 
1972 
1973 
10 
1975.00 
112.30 
125.60 
129.50 
20.0 
Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 
9/76

Economic
Source: Monthly 

TABLE 9
 
BUILDING MATERIALS PRICE INDEX
 
M 
La..
 
0
 
1970 9. 14.8 
1971 6.6 7.7 1.1 
1972 5.2 5.5 1.1 1.1 
1973 8.3 9.3 7.5 10.8 21.5 
1974 12.8 14.6 14.5 19.4 29.8 38.6 
15.7 19.6 26.5 29.,1 20.31975 13.9 15.5 

GUILOING MATERIALS P41CE 1140EX (1970.100)
 
1974 172.10
1971 101.10
1968 83.50 
 1975 207.10
1Q72 102.20 

1970 100.{P0 1973 124.20
 
1969 67.10 

Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
Source: 
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TABLE 10 
PRICE INDEX OF HOUSING IN CITIES
 
C 
w 
a 
II 
0
>e 
19-

I B1 01972 4 
YEARS
 
198 1969 1971 1972 1973 1974
 
1970 7., e.8 
1Q71 7.3 8.2 7.
 
.972 7.7 8.4 8.2 i.9
 
1973 7.0 7.4 6.9 6.6 4.4
 
1974 8.3 8.0 8.9 9.3 9.5 14.9
 
1975 9.3 9.9 10.1 10.7 11.4 15.0 15.2
 
PQICE INDEX Or HOUSING IN CITIES (1970:100)
 
1960 87.00 1971 107'.90 1974 140;40
 
1969 91.90 1972 1975
117.10 161.70
 
1970 100.00 1973 122.20
 
Source: Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
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TABLE 11
 
GROSS PRIVATE OMESTIC SAVINGS
 
0 
19W 
196C0 1961 1962 1963 
198 
1964 1065 
YERS 
1966 1967 1968 
1970 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
1975 
tg"! 
1 06 1 97.4 
.962 10.0 -3 .7 
1063 55.0 37.3 207.6 
'064 54.2 42,1 116.3 52.1 
1965 40.3 2.es 65.0 20.9 -3.9 
1966 4e.9 40,8 73.3 43.2 38.9 100.9 
!067 42.1 34.5 .7.d 33.1 27.4 4a.6 7.1 
1968 30.e 32.0 50.0 29.9 24.0 36.3 12.3 17.8 
1069 
1970 
!971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
44.6 
39.6 
36.8 
38.5 
42.6 
41.5 
39.f 
39.0 
34.5 
31.9 
34.2 
38.6 
37.9 
36.4 
56.3 
48.4 
43.6 
45.1 
49.5 
47.S 
45.0 
39.6 
33.7 
30.5 
33.5 
39.1 
38.0 
36.2 
37.2 
30.9 
27.7 
31.3 
37.8 
36.7 
34.9 
50.1 
39.2 
33.9 
37.3 
44.1 
42.1 
39.5 
36.1 
27.0 
23.5 
28.9 
37.4 
36.1 
34.0 
53.5 100.2 
34.5 43.7 
26.0 31.6 
33.7 38.1 
43.3 49.0 
40.9 45.1 
37.6 40.9 
3.2 
6.7 
22.0 
36.4 
36.1 
32.9 
10.3 
32.6 
52.6 
45. 
39.8 
59.5 
79.6 102.2 
60,1 60.4 
40.4 44.8 
27.2 
22.6 18.2 
1960 
1961 
3 
-044 
15 
GROSS PR!VA-E o0wESTIC SAVIGS (91LLION WON) 
.55 1966 
16.F8 1967 
10.34 1968 
31.1 1969 
48.39 4_970 
.45 
93.37 
99.06 
117.71 
235.63 
243.20 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Q74 
1475 
264.17 
427.74 
064,60 
1099,90 
1299.57 
Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
Source: 

TABLE 	 12 
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195
 
lc71 1972 1073 197w
19od 1969 197C 
190o ,,o 19
u
, 1963 19a" 1965 1906 19o7 

Ivu2 -7.4 -47.4
 
193 2 .. o.b t16 .7
 
IqU4 18l.t coo 51.? be2
 
VItls I..u .4 a4.0 -5.5 -15.9
 
14.2 5L..2
V.' U1.0 11.5
14oo 17.0 

l.6 4.v 16.7 12.k
1ho7 12.3 2.o b.0 

1.6 8.5 -9.3 -6.3
19oa 9.o J.6 1o.2 1.6 

0.9 IC.9 '0.7 10.4 16.1 7.9 19.b 52.7
190o9 13.9 

z.7 ID.3 5.4 5.3 10.1 1.1 6.0 12.7 -16.8
1970 10.. 

-1.1 1,8 4.7 -13.3 -9.b
 1971 8.6 4.1 12.3 3.4 3.0 6.6 

9.7 3.0 7.0 10.7 -.6 8.7 3C.6
 197a *0.1 o.i 14.0 b.l 6.1 

14.8 10.6 14.2 18.8 11.6 23.U 43.5 57.7
 1973 13.e 9.8 17.4 IC.4 10.9 

7.5 14. 24.0 20.8 -7.4
12.1 7.b 10.8 13.9
1974 11.0 0.4 15.1 6.7 8.9 
6.2 10.6 4.6 -14.8 -21.6
3.11 6.1 6.C 2.0 
1.75 	 9.C D.9 11.7 b*.7 5.7 6.2 

% -R14,TE UDIESTIC S N4IS AS A PERCEINT OF GI'P
 
e.50
 
lvu. 	 1966 9.0%) 1971 
 11.10
7.9L 1972
1967
Ig 5.7v 
1966 	 17.50
7.4u 1973
3..
19 	 1974 16.20
1VU3 11.30
b.Q% 909 

S.w 1970 	 q.4u 1975 l.70
 
Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 and 9/76
Source: 

Capital Investment
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GPc.Sm MC6.5TIC Crp!T L FORIfiT!ON 
Table 14 
D Dllings 
X Non Residential Iuitdints 
+ Other Construction & works 
I Transport Equipm'nt
 
0 machinery & Other Equipment 
 "
 
/
- Increase in Stocks 
u / 
zg
 
1900 1965 1970 197!
 
YEARS 
, 1973 197,
1 , 1Qi' 1462 1063 1964 1965 I;o6 1967 1968 1969 jq7n 1q71 1972 

"
 1')!) 44.
 
,6 5 3'1.3 17.2
 
10'63 49.; 52.5 98.5
 
,o64 39., 38.1 53.3 13.3
 
• 55 : 33.? 14.0 . 6 .3 1.4.3
 
105t 42.9 42.1 dI.1 35.5 41.2 34.3 
IJ67 j.0 39.1 43.9 32.5 43.1 i.9 25.2 
36.5 43.1 51.9 30.1 52.319 6 3 41.4 40.7 45.3 

43.4 50.2 40.4 48.6 45,11969 41.3 41.4 45.3 37.9 

107n 38.7 30.0 40.0 34.1 30.0 42.0 33.1 35.9 28.3 13.5
 
7
10 . 36.3 35,4 37.6 3t.5 34.3 37.0 29.1 30.1 23,5 13.9 14.3 
27.5 29.4 31.0 23.7 23.4 17.1 9.1 6.9 .01Q7' 32.1 31.5 33.3 
35.6 33.5 32.6 34,3 28.4 29.0 24.7 20.1 22.4 26.7 60,41Q73 34.7 33.9 

• o4 36.7 3A,1 37.6 33.3 35, 37,4 32.4 33.5 
 30,6 27.9 31.8 39,2 62.5 64.5 
10i- 35.2 34.6 3- ,. 3.. 33.5 35.1 30.6 31.3 28.5 26.0 28.6 32.4 45.4 38.5 16.4f 
"T' AL .IW3S3 P3I ,JAT."J ISSTJ. '01TAL ,.IqMATI34 (.ILLION WON) 
P .9 .;66 224.48 1Q71 605.. 
3i.7" :643? 280.97 1972 905.g 
1.96 45,47 19-33 91.16-96  
427.97520.70 
19731974 1292,.r2125 
Q.064 ,2.74 
.-A. .Sa 
1073 74,66 1975 2479-0 
TABLE 14 (cont.) 
1967 196q 1969 1970
C.: 1061 0o03 19,' 1;9s6 

*; *. 07.7 
a
 
:o6 2 4,3 
 11..

F:O.4 34..3 51.7 
11.1 20.7 33.6 47.5 32.9 
1.6, 25.4 33.8 36.2 45.3 42.2 52.0 
38.9 32.71Q67 26.5 33.7 37.1 42.0 42.0 
47.8 9$1.7 51.8 73.2lcAg 31. 36.7 42.5 46.6 
37.7 13.739.3 41.5 39.5 41.2 40.31069 29.7 38.0 
46.3 34.4 56.943.8 42.5 44.6 42.71171 32.3 37.7 40.4 
37.4 30.9 36.2 19.2 36.7 37.7 27.6 35.2 15.0 1911 30.7 39.3 

30.. 23.7
!P.. 32.0 33.5 39.3 33.3 33.4 30.5 21.1 9.1 10"2 

33.5 35.C 35.7 35.2 39.5 33.2 33.3 26.5 30.0 21.61973 29.6 

40.9 40.6 40.2.1

.074 33.3 37.1 36.9 39.8 39.2 
35.6 

36.7 35.2 39.2 35.536.9 41.3 39.3 40.0 39.5:07 33.4 38.5 

',.EL-LINSS te lL.O'l uWN)
 
1966 
 21.16
5.34
1961 
 2810
1967
4.03
1111 
 40.67
107 5.q91 166 
 99.35
6.C1 196; 
 67.93
1970
10.46
!11%4 

015 13.q3
 
196 1970
:963 1965 1966 1067 1969
198f. 196: 1902 1964 

2f.1 3.7
 
.962 3C.5 e4.3 
tQ51 3M.*3 46.:* 29.9
 
._64 31.1 40.4 29E 29.6
 
4.1 90.1"265 37.0 43.1 73.9
 
4..0 45.6 21.9"15 3S.1 42.4 37.4 
1,7 35.i '1.2 37.t 3S.5 42.0 25.3 35.1 
43.6 41.7
146 36.' 42.2 39.3 43.7 34.8 46.6
 
34.6 4 . 42.3 35.4 40.2 42.9 37.41469 36.9 41.6 

3M.5 40.0 34.1 37.3 36.1 33.1 28.9
1970 36.0 4.1 37.4 
27.3 26.8 20.2 12.5 -1.9 1271 32.fl 35.2 32.3 32.6 33.1 28.4 
29.3 24.3 22.3 16.5 10.2 1:9 1Q72 29.6 32.3 29.' ?0.4 24.0 
32.9 33.2 33.6 29.3 30.4 29.6 26.1 23.5 21.7Q'.3 32.6 35.3 
31.5 31.6 31.6 ?7.9 26.6 27.7 24.9 22.1 20.5 
1174 31.4 33.0 
?6.3 23.729.6 2.9 24.6
32.0 32.1 32.4 26.81975 31.9 34.0 
39:03
6.42 1066
1 
 52.73
1967
6.66
1941 
 7f.3819 8
11.04io-2 
 407.66969
14.71.103 
 1970 139.821!.42
114 
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1971 1972 

3.9
 
25." 50.9 
43.6 69.1 

41.2 .6.6 

1971 

Q.972 

073 

1974 

1975 

1971 1972 

5.9 
35.6 73.7 
29.0 42.4 
31.1 '0.6 

1971 

1972 

1973 

197' 

1979 

1973 1974
 
69.5
 
59.6 34.4 
101.14
 
104.65
 
157.92
 
299.27
 
402,13
 
1973 1974
 
16.6 
26,! 37.7
 
136;14
 
164.16
 
290;40
 
292.43
 
402.74
 
TABLE 14 (cont.) 
194.i 70.2 
t96? %2.1 Y?.0 
I IJq 4A, . 4,9 ,*4 
' J 4; . 2.1 ." , 3.4 
1965 40. t 37.3 32. 27.0 37. 
-,be 42.9 3e.0 38.2 37,4 47.4 58.5 
1967 39.9 35.4 35.1 33.7 38.5 39.8 23.2 
1968 42.0 3e.4 38.6 38.2 43.4 45,6 39.5 57.9 
41.9 46.8 49.4 46.5 59.7 61.51969 44.1 41.1 41.7 
37.8 37.3 '0.6 41.3 37.3 42.4 35.2 13.1.970 43.6 37.7 
32.1 34.1 33.6 29.1 3.1.6 22.6 6.8 .91'1 36.5 33.5 33.1 
1V? 33.4 33.5 29.e 29.0 29.8 28.9 ?4.5 	 24.7 17.6 5.8 2.3 3.8 
249 19.1. 10. 4 9.4.65 14.4. 25.52 9.4Q3 32.7 30.0 P9.4 3 25.4 
1974 32.3 29.7 25,. 29.1 .0,9.2 ?4.8 	 25.1 20.3 13.4 13.5 1.0 25.8 26.2 
26,0 34.4 39.0 53.11o0S 33.6 31.3 30.? 3 0 31.1 30.5 27.7 	 28.3 24.5 19.2 21.5 
ITHER CONSTqUCTION 4'0 404'S (BILLION dON) 
1966 53.38 1 71 191.44
 1060 	 6.27 
 190.65
1967 	 65.77 1972
1951, 1.t7 
 1973 249.24
1469 103.86 	 3 4.591462 	 14.62 1969 167.77 197;1.01 20.9 
1;54 24.55 1970 189.52 1975 401.76
 
33.67
1065 

116 1061 V6? 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 197 1972 1973 1974 
1'61 60.7 
1962 47.2 34.9. 
.363 59.2 5!.' 86.! 
1444 33.6 25.7 21.3 -21.0 
1;65 37.3 32.1 31.1 1..1 53.3 
'", 49.5 47.4 1;1.7 40.5 97.2 126.7 
1967 55.9 55.1 50.5 53.4 91.4 .. JO 90.0 
1'),S 52.11 50.9 53.P 4q.0 73.1 50.3 60.1 29.3 
1969 51.1 49.9 52.2 47.2 66.7 70.2 54.2 35.5 43.1 
1073 45.0 43.3 44.4 39.3 53.1 53.0 33.4 22.4 19.6 -. 0 
17 1 43.5 41.8 42.6 34.0 49.4 48.8 36.5 24.1 22.7 13.6 29.2 
1972 41.0 39.3 39.7 35.4 44.8 43.6 32.9 22.5 21.1 14.5 22.5 16,2 
1173 40.9 39.4 39.8 35.8 44.2 13.2 33.0 25.2 24.6 20.4 28.1 27.6 '0.1 
1974 44.7 43.6 44.3 41.0 49,4 49.0 41.2 34.4 35.4 33.9 44.1 49.4 69,5 105.0 
1975 42.4 41.1 41.6 36.4 45.7 44.9 37.8 31.5 32.0 30.2 37.3 39.4 48.1 52.2 13.0 
TQA'SOOq' ir)UJP -'lJT (31LLI'JI '404) 
1956 26.71 1971 126.59
1960 	 2.39 
 147.04
53.39 1972
1961 	 3.S4 0967 
68.48 1973 206.041962 	 5.19 1969 
;8.01 19,4 422.40
11 A3 9.64 1969 
164 7.62 1970 97:97 1Q75 477.39
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TABLE 14 (cont.) 
1971 1972 .1973 197419701949 196'1166 1967lob' 19651982 19631e'0 19*1 
1,.33.1
 
38.3
:,63 3;.' 42.9 

M e. :1.4
10,44 !';.1 3M.4 
1 1 , .% .,, 34.8 32.2 24.2 37.0 
Iah6 40.1 5?.9 !&4.3 61.0 83.4 %45.5 
106? 42,. 44.0 43.3 44.6 53.1 61. 
6.7 
!04i d3. 45.4 45.0 46.4 53.3 
69.1 28.1 53.9 
1v60 39.7 40.S 39.5 39.7 43.6 
4!.3 22.0 30.4 10.6 
:070 36.3 36.6 35.3 34.9 
37.2 37.2 i8.7 23.0 9.9 
9:3 
1171. 35.6 
19'2 32.9 
1.73 36.1 
:10' 35.4 
1071 35.3 
33.8 
32.8 
35.2 
3S.5 
35.4 
34.5 
31:A 
34.2 
34.6 
34.5 
34.1 
30.7 
33.8 
34.3 
34.2 
39.9 
31.8 
35.1 
35.6 
35.3 
35.6 
31.1 
34.9 
35.4 
35.2 
20.6 
16.1 
23.9 
25.7 
26.5 
24.3 
20.5 
27.0 
26.' 
29.2 
t5.8 
13.4 
22.2 
24.9 
20.1 
18.5 
14.4 
25.3 
2t.0 
29.0 
28.6 
17.0 
31.1 
33.1 
33.2 
6.5 
32.4 
34.7 
34.3 
64.7 
51.5 
'5.1 
39.4 
36.3 33.2 
WON)44D OTWER -AUIPM-'4T (BILLION'4& t|.ERY 174.41
1971
65.39
1966 1$5.73
6.12 1972

"960 72.97
1967
d,1 19,33.03
1461 .12271969 426.2712.C? 19$41962 124.15
1069 S67.81
16.69 1075
10e3 135.66
1970
20.34

'.)t,4 

) 1,
; 3 ].974
1T472
96 7 197
1970
1969
1966J
14

.Qb4 1.965 1966
1.:363 

. 196,. jq62 

01;63 3&3.5 :22.2 
*1 -6.4
1. 5' 19. .1. 66.6 
.0 .h4.4 -q6.5 
4.)55 t .{, -1.1t 
1= .3 2 . S -0. 5 1. 9 461 9
 
69.8 -49.3
 
.c .22.5 -27.2
12.. 102.4
t.V7 63.2 79.3 1.,3

.0 -4,.1 -6.0
2:.1
1168 67.6 

62.5 190.9 318.0 26.6 121.6 
. 20.45.5 40.4179 

83.3 -19.689.450.9 35.3
.0 13.7 17.4
31.9
1170 70.7 
5.6 30.975.3 67.173.1 36.8 n 16.5 20.332.61971 67.5 
11,7 -28.0 -31.9 -66.6 5.1 25.8
2.5 36.8

.0 j.44J.4 1.7.01172 366.631.2 27.5A9.9 16.0 21. 60.4 34,1 57.6 
.0 11.650.6 31.71'73 69.9 283.3 201.9 66.5 40.5 
.0 29.2 33.4 72.0 43.4 
73.0 s1.5 
68.3 4C.4 9.2 .60.61774 79.715.013,7 21.943.8 37,048,5 28.1
.2 17.n, 14.4
28.?
1075 52.5 

1'4 STOCAS($ M-tL1t1' A341q
1I': -Si 
763
1.971
59 
 25.25
1966 1972

.25 
 slot. 122.86

. 1967 1973
4.41 1.21 370.93
1,4%. 068 1974

-3.*. 
 146 ,54
1a2 19 1 7' 
-3967.76
22.22 5 4 .76 
-
 17 G
27 

Source 
 2, 
Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 9/75 
and 9/76 
Soure:. onthly 
The Role of Interest Rates in the Korean Economy
 
and Housing Finance Market
 
The Korean economy is presently characterized by a
 
mixture of credit markets ranging from government allocated
 
credit at administered interest rates to informal credit
 
markets involving no formal financial institutions whatsoever.
 
The government has chosen to use interest rates as
 
a direct tool of subsidy in the economy and as a result
 
formal credit markets do not allocate funds according to
 
effective demand as might occur in a more market oriented
 
system. The structure of interest rates is highly complex
 
and reflects a myriad of special interest groups which
 
benefit from the administered below-market interest rates.
 
The monetary board which is effectively under the
 
control of the ministry of finance sets the upper limit
 
Within those limits banks
 on interest rates for all banks. 

free to adjust rates as they deem appropriate. Many
are 

rates are set through agreement among banks by the Bankers
 
A further element of interest rate intervention
Association. 

occurs as a result of the fact that the government is a
 
major stockholder of five city banks which are the major
 
Government policy
private banks within the country of Korea. 

encompasses the provision of low cost credit to areas of
 
high government priority. Lo', rates are made available to
 
Because of this intervention
export and key industries. 
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similar loans and deposits have different interest rates.
 
Often these rates are arbitrarily set without rational
 
standards. Interest rates do not always vary according
 
to risk, cost of handling or supply and demand. Rather
 
the interest rates are a reflection of current governmental
 
priorities and desired investment directions.
 
As a result of the tight control of formal financial
 
institutions and interest rates which they are allowed
 
to charge, substantial informal market activity (curb
 
market) has developed which serves credit needs not served
 
by the banking system and provides returns to investors
 
consistent with the financial and inflationery risks
 
existing in the economy and in the individual business
 
enterprise. An indication of the proliferation of interest
 
rates which exists in the Korean economy can be gained
 
from Table 15 and Table 16 which show the interest rates
 
prevailing in 1976 for various types of loans and deposits
 
in the Korean banking system. Table 15, which shows the
 
return paid for deposits, indicates the wide range of
 
rates which are available, ranging from a zero rate of­
return on checking accounts to a rate of return of over
 
26% per year, available on some accounts in mutual savings
 
and finance companies, to over 40% annual return for some
 
Curb Market investments. The proliferation of rates in
 
the twelve to twenty percent range would seem to indicate
 
that except for demand deposits and other special instances,
 
it is unlikely that a sizeable portion of market funds
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can be attracted at anything less than twelve percent
 
in the Korean economy and deposit rates in the 16 to 20%
 
range may be more realistic if a serious effort is made
 
to generate housing funds through the private savings
 
market. Table 16 shows the rate of interest charged on
 
loans in the economy, demonstrating the wide variation
 
in interest rates among institutions. The great dispersion
 
in these rates is a reflection of the fact that a substantial
 
amount of government intervention in credit direction
 
occurs in the Korean money markets.
 
The government of Korea, acting through the monetary
 
board, has used below market interest rates as a major
 
tool of government policy by providing subsidized interest
 
loans to sectors of high economic priority. The general
 
practice of granting subsidies through interest rates
 
effectively makes the amount of subsidy directly proportional
 
to the amount of capital employed. Indirectly then, the
 
government is providing an incentive for the maximum employ­
ment of capital by borrowers.
 
An indication of market interest rates can be gained
 
from an examination of selective relatively free rates
 
First the Bank of Korea has a rediscount
shown in the table. 

rate at approximately the nineteen percent level. Commercial
 
banks for ordinary business loans are charging 18 to 25
 
percent. Further evidence of the government control of
 
credit markets is indicated by the pattern of interest
 
rates existing in the special purpose government controlled
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As the
 
banks numbered three through eight in the table. 

table shows in these controlled banks there 
are no loans
 
interest rate hiqher than 18 percent. The
 bearing an 

high cost of consumer and small business credit 
is indicated
 
Mutual
 
by the rates shown for the institutions 12 and 
14. 

savings and finance companies having loan rates 
varying
 
from 21 to 36 percent and the curb market with 
effective
 
interest rates of 36 to 40 percent.
 
The interest rate tables for loans and deposits 
provide
 
a substantial indication that the nation is 
going to have
 
great difficulty generating substantial private 
housing
 
capital under the present approaches to capital 
formation.
 
Mortgaqe interest rates generally fall into 
one of three
 
8 percent loans, 9 1/2 percent loans and
 categories: 

Based on the evidence presented these
 14 percent loans. 

interest rates appear to be entirely inadequate 
if there
 
a desire to attract private funds into housing 
investment.
 
is 
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TABLE 15
 
40 INTEREST VZATES ON EroSlTS 
38 
36 
BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION 
34 
32 
30 
28 
26 
24 
22 
20 
18 
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I. 
2. 
3. 
30tT MOST &AM 
Tim.m ad leies Deposits 
TIme Deposits 16.01 
Time Deposit@ in for. cur. £5.0Z 
Iatealleet Savings 14.2t 
SowingmAsmiastI 12. 6 
Feuerto ad Fishro 6 .01 
Notice 1.01 
Died Depesits 
Nseehold 6.02 
child em's 6.02 
Time ad svials Depoeits 
Nw oeeehoLd 4.62 
l.d Deposits 
Welfare 3.61 4. 
Pasbook 1.01 
Tm pswry 1.02 
110111461TWIT 
unit Operation 
23.22 
Devetopmeet3 leers 19.02 5. 
2 leers 16.21 
N Specific 
3 Teers 11.41 
2 Testse 11.21 
16 metho 16.82 
1 lees 16.6 
?e@ioo 14.1 
Imatelitmt Trust fe Purpose 
62 Meth* 14.1 
30 Mtnhe 14.21 
I: "ethO 14.02 
OSTALSAVIWI.S 
fovieae Certificatee 
•I veer 16.21 
Over I veere 16.2 
6 Metbe 15.61 
Months 
fixed Term 
3 Tets 
Tests 
Is Mathe 
Of Unions 
Flied Teom 
1 eer 
6 Monthe 
For Tax Fayeete 
Savinge Crtificates-I so. 
Ordinary 
Pestal Tranefer 
HUIAL TINS DERSITS 
26 Ihetb 
13 Nsthe 
16 Mnih 
10 Deps100 Sepe 
SIT1AL CRnIT COOIRAT1Ih.S 
Mtual lostallmmt Svings 
3 Tears 
lim Deposits
1 fear 
2 veero 
Ilstuel letolimemt savingsK 
2 leers 
Is Hethe 
Time Deposit@ 
6 Methe 
Ndtgdl ItsIet11at Savinns 
I fear 
Tlie Deposits 
3N the 
tHiuol Inestilmet Savneinge 
6 iet 
Tim Deposit - 1 "nth 
Shart Tae begotts 
15.002 
14.281 
1.20 
12.721 
12.601 
12.261 
10.041 
8.402 
8.041 
4.801 
2.402 
1-272 
17.2-241 
11-251 
16-20214-161 
6.eo2 
16.00 
16.00 
13.601 
15.001 
14.602 
11,,602 
1 602 
5" 
00 
. INYSTPMT ANDFINAI.I COMANIF 
Resaled with son-Recurse 
60-9 Pays 1.41)1 
Potes Issued with Recourse 
Over 90 pays 1.4162 
Rooled With "on-Recouree 
30-59 Days 1.4i10 
Notee Iesued With Recourse 
60-69 Coys 1.2712 
30-59 Daye 1.2242 
Resled with PNt-Recouree 
5-29 Dae 1.0)22 
Noes Issued with Recourse . 
8-29 Days .831. 
Resled with Noo-lecourse 
1-7 Deys .1082 
Notee Imeod with Recourse 
1-7 Days .3421 
7.CU MAuRr1 ?ITI UIISe 
Curb Market lvestments 42. 462 
Source: Monthly Economic 
Statistics, Bank ofKorea, 10/76 
t
"ABLE 16 
40 INTEREST RATES ON LOANS 
38 BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION 
36 
34 
32 
30 
28 
26 
24 
22 
20 
18 
16 . ' 
14 
10 
8 
6 
4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9. 10 11 12 
13 
II.lIll IfIRlIST RATESON IMAL' AM1 DISCOUITS KOeFAIIIIiSINC RANK 
-1-
l r 3911.ANKt IWA -9. t" for:tit h rs 1 , ] l l i A F d  
Discounts for Commercil Bills? Aortmsent I.:oltritet
ln 1.02 
others 14.0t Other 
Condtsurtion 18.0? 
prIma Foterlrip I3.02 iHousing%Ite 
formina Fund for: 
7 llnorllg 
tor"rntoon I15.0? 
Import@ 6.5? Iocl 
; overoment" isntzl~rle] i.a.ee 
Ari mother projects 4.11? Priv0Cte.o 
ioe len 4.01 Trod Fund of Cot 
tttertnlfl (Oct 
upeoct Prop of lpi &marine 3.52 Operation Is.0z 
Supplier ofUS offshore proc 3.52 Equipment 
15.5% 
Exports 3.51 Itousinlt 
Fund fort?IRO 
Advarces to Goverruant 2.01 Company 
Residence 15.5t 
Deposits: Grade A 
(alfteraupry) 15.3? 
H1AlS INTEREST RATESON LOANSAND DISOUITS Credo A 
OF DEF.POITMONI BANKS - C0141[RCLAL-2-
(before expry) 14.0? 
Loans Overdue 25.01 
Credo I 14.0? 
Call Loam 20.011 
Houslng tlprov 14.02 
L4erdraft 19.02 
Grade C 12-16l 
Loans omi nltsll.t Svin 19 CeoPublic 1t2tles8.01 
Loans with rollatnral of Install 13.01 
Losma for 11achineInd. promotion 14.01 
Loans for Equip of hsport Ind. 14.02 AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIYES -4-
Loans with NIt hlPme1t4.0l2nstall. 
Loans for Exports 9.01 Bankinl Fund 
forL 
ioess for supplies In Foreiln Usurious 
Debt Settlement 17.0? 
Cutrmcy 8.01 Fisteryt 
Loans fr tapeortPrep. of Agri. To 
fishery 17.01 
& Iarlle Pred. 8.01 To Cooperatives 
17.01 
Los$ ORmaNosehold Deposits 7.81 For Deep Son 
Fishing 11.01 
Airiculture and Forestry 11.0? 
Alricultural Productlcl 13.02 
Aficultural Penlon FInd 12.0? 
AgrI. iroduction (govt fund) 
Short term 10.0? 
Mledium term 9.05 
5 to 15 year$ 9.02 
Loans for export prep of 
agrt andmarina prod 8.01 
Cwernment Fund fort 
varahowoe Coaetrsctis 8.02 
groglltlon 3.32 
iNll rI tyIr -­
aninla Fund For:He , lI o.' I n .11 t r y 
yq'itr of Ik. Imilnatry 
o'oper4tIve tuslnese 
tornarnt Fud for! 
I8.021 011,per.at Ire fill-Inteel 
11,,lit 
rlrin Loan Fund Froml 
AID 
PAC 
CITI.F.NSNATIONAL IANK -4 
InkIna Fund for* 
le5omerstionit 
lot Dliminishtn 
raovernuentFund for: 
Lon oniRFu d 
e n ort 
2nd Dmimnishlng 
on 
L,oan With ColAtpCral 
of motual Intalml. 
Rlem tletions 
3rd OIl elinlhienX 
4th Uimlnihinl 
5th Diminishing 
Covernment Fund for: 
Loos on Relief 
Agent liAna 
I . 01 
18.01 
I8.01 
I,.4411 01 
00Ii. 
6.01 
17.041 
.ort 
15.98! 
1S.501 
15.002 
14.931 
13.742 
13.141 
8.S02 
5.002 
TABLE lb (cont.)
 
FISHERIES COOPERATIVE -7-

Banking Fund for: 

Short Term 

Others 

Culturing Laver 

Medium and Long Term 

Cons. of Fishing Boat 

Other Equipment 

Short Term
 
Assistance for Export 

Government Fund for:
 
Short Term 

Fishery Loans 

Manufacturing 

Stabilizing Price 

Medium and Long Term 

Const of Fishing Boat 

Equipment of Agriculture 

Processing 

Banking Fund for: 

Short Term
 
Assistance for Export 

Foreign Loan Funds 

Short Term 

Medium and Long Term 

KOREA DEVELOPMENT BANK -8-

Counterpart Funds 

Operating 

Industrial Funds
 
Internal Fund for: 

Key Industry - Operating 

Other Industry - Equip 

Operating 

Government Fund for: 

Operating 

Equipment 

Internal Fund for 

Key Industry - Equip 

Counterpart Funds 

Equipment 

Foreign Loan Funds 

Counterpart Funds
 
Special 

Industrial Funds:
 
Govt Funds for:
 
Special Loan 

19.0% 

13.0% 

12.5% 

12.5%
 
9.0% 

9.0% 

9.0%
 
9.0%
 
9.0%
 
9.0% 

9.0% 

9.0%
 
5.75%
 
5.75% 

18.0%
 
15.5%
 
15.5% 

15.5% 

15.5%
 
12.0%
 
12.0%
 
12.0%
 
8-10%
 
7.5%
 
7.5%
 
TRUST ACCOUNTS -9-
Loans 
Loans on Usufruct: 
3 Years 
2 Years 
18 Months 
1 Year 
23.5% 
18.4% 
18.2% 
17.8% 
17.6% 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES -10-

Mortgage Loans 22.0%
 
Loans by Clause 13-22 %
 
-11-INVESTMENT AND FINANCE COMPANIES 

Discount - 3rd party 1.65% 
Discount - Bank Guaranty 1.56% 
1.56%Discount 

MUTUAL SAVINGS AND FINANCE COMPANIES -12­
33.6-36%
 
Loans on Mutual Time Deposits
 
13 Months 

Loans on Credit 

29.98%
 
100 Days 29.20%
 
180 Days 28.48%
 
26.20%
 
26 Months 

18 Months 
23.98%
 
MUTUAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES -13­
22.0%
General Loans 

Loans on Mutual Instal, sa. 22.0%
 
Loans on Free Inst. savings 20.4%
 
-14-
CURB MARKET 

36.5, 40%
Curb Market 

Source: Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 10/76
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The Korean Financial System
 
Housing finance in Korea operates within a structure
 
of inter-related financial institutions under the general
 
(see supplementary Tables
direction of the ministry of finance 

A, B, C and D at the end of the chapter). The following dis­
cussion provides a brief overview of the structure of the
 
Korean financial system and its relevance for the development
 
of housing finance institutions in the country.
 
The Bank of Korea
 
the central bank of the government
The Bank of Korea is 

of South Korea and is effectively under the control of the
 
ministry of finance. The Economic Planning Board, the Ministry
 
of Finance and the Bank of Korea determine the Bank of Korea
 
policy as it effects monetary policy, money supply, monetary
 
The Bank of Korea does not pursue
aggregates and targets. 

an independent monetary policy, partially because the Bank
 
has an obligation to fund the national deficit by purchasing
 
government securities bearing an interest rate of two percent
 
per year. A spokesman for the Bank of Korea estimated that
 
the 1976 money supply may increase by approximately 300
 
billion won or approximately 25 percent of the beginning
 
stock. Of this amount, the government deficit was expected
 
to account for approximately 50 billion won.
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the country
The general responsibility for credit in 

The nine-member
is in the hands of the monetary board. 

the minister
board consists of two ex-officio members: 

of finance and the governor of the Bank of Korea. Other
 
members are the minister of economic planning board, two
 
representatives from banking institutions, two nominees
 
from the agricultural sector, and two from the commerce
 
and industry sector.
 
The Bank of Korea has not given a high priority to
 
the provision of mortgage credit nor has it encouraged
 
commercial banks to become involved in mortgage lending
 
There is a prevailing attitude
for residential purposes. 

in the central bank that mortgage loans represent the
 
financing of consumption rather than production and therefore
 
are not to be encouraged by monetary or banking policy.
 
It appears that the Bank of Korea will not be in a position
 
to take a major role in the assembly of housing funds
 
within the forseeable future.
 
Special Banks
 
The high demand for capital funds resulting from Korea's
 
rapid growth combined with the relatively high level of
 
inflation accompanying that growth has made it impossible
 
to obtain long term bank loans through ordinary banking
 
channels with funds provided from private sources. As
 
a result of this situation and consistent with the active
 
role of government in the national credit markets, eight
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special purpose banks were established in the period from
 
1954 to 1969 for the specific purpose of building up the
 
Korean economy. The banks were specially charged with
 
providing long term loans to the various economic sectors
 
within the country. The eight special banks are under
 
the direction of the ministry of finance and are charged
 
with financing the industrial sectors, often at artificially
 
low interest rates, so as to achieve the goals in each
 
five year plan. The special purpose banks come under
 
the direction of both the ministry of finance and to
 
some extent the monetary board inasmuch as they operate
 
in several fields subject to the control of the Monetary
 
Board. The banks were basically established using government
 
funds, however, in recent years with a larger portion
 
of their funds coming from the private sector, they have
 
become competitors of the commercial banking system.
 
The banks and a brief explanation of their purpose are
 
as follows:
 
I. 	The Korean Development Bank (assets, 3,015 billion
 
won, September 1976). The Bank is charged with
 
supporting key development projects and secondary
 
industry in the development of the national infra­
structure. The Bank borrows from the government,
 
other national agencies and international agencies
 
as funds are available.
 
II. 	 The Korean Exchange Bank (assets, 2,232 billion
 
won, August 1976). The Korean Exchange Bank engages
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in financing businesses related to foreign trade
 
for forein exchango
and in the selling and buiying 

international transactions.
 to facilitate all tvpes of 

foreign currency deposits of the
 Bank resources are 

Bank of Korea and foreign bank borrowings.
 
The 	Medium Industry Bank (assets, 322 billion
III. 

The Medium Industry Bank grants
won, August 1976). 

loans to medium and small businesses defined as
 
businesses having assets of less than 50 million
 
won and having a limited number of employees.
 
The Bank obtains funds from private deposits, borrows
 
from the government and has the power to issue
 
government guaranteed medium industry debentures.
 
The 	National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation
IV. 

and Member Cooperatives (assets, 706 billion won,
 
August 1976). The Bank provides funds for agri­
cultural cooperatives, farming, fishing enterprises,
 
loans to local government and related activities.
 
Resources of the Bank come from deposit co-ops
 
borrowing from the federation. The federation
 
has 473 offices, the largest number of banking
 
offices in the country.
 
(assets, 321 billion
V. 	The Citizen's National Bank 

won, August 1976). The Citizen's National Bank
 
is designed to fill the banking needs of households
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and 	small enterprises and is a type'of formalization
 
of the "MUJIN" (similar to Kye companies). Primary
 
loans of the Bank consist of loans to depositors.
 
The Bank receives regular deposits and deposits
 
used to secure borrowings. It obtains funds
 
from national savings debentures, and borrows
 
from the Bank of Korea and the government. It
 
also receives proceeds from the Salaried and Wage
 
Earners Fortune Formation Savings Deposits.
 
VI. 	 The Central Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives
 
and Member Cooperatives (assets, 75.7 billion
 
won, August 1976). This institution is for the
 
purpose of aiding fishermen and marine product
 
manufacturers. Funds are obtained from deposits,
 
and borrowings from the government and the Bank
 
of Korea.
 
VII. 	 The Korea Export-Import Bank. The bank was organized
 
to service long term export affairs. Although
 
legally established in 1969, the business of the
 
Korea Export-Import Bank is tentatively being
 
handled by the Korea Exchange Bank due to its
 
small scale. The only source of funds for the
 
Bank is government borrowings.
 
VIII. 	 The Korean Housing Bank. T" Korean Housing Bank.
 
being the major instrument of housing finance
 
-53­
in the country is discussed in the following 
section
 
of the paper.
 
Commercial Banks
 
The commercial banking system is the primary 
system
 
of financial institutions serving Korean businesses.
 
Commercial banks are regulated by the Monetary 
Board and
 
Comnercial banks are
 
are financed by the Bank of Korea. 

These banks are
 
subject to the General Banking Act. 

some of which are con­
characterized by short term loans, 

tinually renegotiated making them in effect, 
long term
 
Terms and conditions may be renegotiated at each
 loans. 

rollover of the loans.
 
Commercial banks depend heavily upon the Bank 
of
 
In 1973,

Korea for a high proportion of their funds. 

for example, approximately 20 percent of loans 
and discounts
 
This can be largely
 
was financed by the Bank of Korea. 

attributed to the general approach to credit markets,
 
the high demand for funds generated by the economy's 
rapid
 
growth, and the relatively underdeveloped private 
capital
 
market.
 
The commercial banking industry in Korea can be 
divided
 
up into several major divisions. These are:
 
(assets, 5,325 billion
I. 	Nation-wide city banks 

These are the largest private
won, August 1976). 

banks in the country and all are headquartered
 
The nationwide city banks have historically
in Seoul. 

(and owned to varying
been heavily influenced 
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degrees) by the government. The banks are an
 
explicit tool of government policy and are granted
 
interest subsidies to cover losses which would
 
otherwise occur on certain loans.
 
II. 	 Local banks (assets, 835 billion won, August 1976).
 
There are ten local banks all of which are entirely
 
privately owned. The combined assets of local
 
banks are equal to approximately one-seventh of
 
Local
the combined assets of the city banks. 

banks were established to maintain banking facilities
 
outside of Seoul and to stem the flow of funds
 
going into city banks. Local banks are allowed
 
to pay an interest differential of 2% above the
 
rate paid by city banks.
 
III. 	 The Korea Trust Bank (assets, 306 billion won,
 
The Korea Trust Bank specializes
August 1976). 

of the assets
in trust business. It has 4.7% 

of all commercial banks.
 
IV. 	Foreign banks (assets, 352.5 billion won, August
 
1976). Foreign banks, with the approval of the
 
monetary board, are allowed to open and operate
 
same procedures as
branches in Korea under the 

Foreign banks are subject to
commercial banks. 

certain regulations and restrictions under the
 
foreign exchange control laws and obtain their
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funds from somewhat different sources 
than the
 
typical domestic bank.
 
Mortgage Lending by Commercial Banks
 
Commercial Banks in the Republic of Korea 
presently
 
make no long term mortgage loans nor 
can they be expected
 
The Bank of Korea and the
 to do so in the near future. 

Ministry of Finance have not encouraged 
banks to move
 
Over and above
 
into residential real estate lending. 

this official view, there are reasons 
for the lack of
 
mortgage lending which are both practical 
and philosophical.
 
First, on the philosophical side, the 
economic view of
 
mortgage has been that mortgage lending 
is for consumption
 
The banks consider
 
rather than lending for production. 

themselves to be the financiers of the 
nation's production
 
and business and so find mortgage lending 
to fall outside
 
of that sphere. On a more practical basis, 
business loans
 
bear a higher interest rate than has prevailed 
on residential
 
seem highly cognizant of
 Commercial banks
mortgages. 

the inflation in the Korean economy and 
have maintained
 
a posture of short term lending as a strategy 
for dealing
 
It seems unlikely that
 
with this economic uncertainty. 

those
 
banks would find long term mortgage loans 
such as 

issued by the Korean Housing Bank to be attractive 
in
 
It is not clear whether
 the present economic context. 

the Bank of Korea or the commercial banking 
system would
 
support the development of a system of savings 
and loan
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associations or other institutions primarily devoted to
 
mortgage financing.
 
Other Financial Institutions
 
A number of other financial institutions of varying
 
importance exist in the Korean economy. These consist
 
of the following:
 
I. 	Insurance companies; there are six life insurance
 
companies operating in the Korean economy and
 
twelve other insurance companies. Total assets
 
of all insurance companies equal four percent
 
of ,those of commercial banking institutions.
 
introduced in 1972,
II. 	 Short-term finance companies; 

they handle short term dealings in commercial
 
paper and raise funds by the issuance of their
 
Interest rates are market determined.
own paper. 

These companies have been a growing factor in
 
the Korean economy.
 
III. 	 Mutual credit companies; mutual credit companies
 
smaller scale than other financial
operate on a 

institutions. They obtain their money through
 
installment savings and extend small loans with
 
installment repayments. As of August 1976, assets
 
of mutual credit companies equaled 1.1% of those
 
commercial banks. Mutual credit companies are
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essentially an outgrowth of the curb market and
 
were formally institutionalized in 1972 when the
 
government passed laws which attempted to formalize
 
the curb market transactions.
 
The Korean stock exchange, established in 1956,
IV. 

trades in a limited number of corporate stocks.
 
In August 1976 the market value of listed stocks
 
19.2% of the total assets of commercial
was equal to 

banking institutions. Average yields range from
 
12.7% on stocks to 21.4% on bonds.
 
Summary and Conclusion
 
The present structure of the institutional financial
 
system in Korea is highly oriented to the achievement
 
of official government goals. The system is essentially
 
composed of a central bank which plays an active role
 
in providing funds often at below market interest rates
 
to key sectors in the economy. The central bank essentially
 
becomes an extension of fiscal policy as a result of its
 
financing the national debt and secondly as a result of
 
its being the source of interest rate subsidy to key indus-

The central bank and the associated commercial
tries. 

banks are essentially uninvolved in the provision of mortgage
 
funds. Special banks are each geared to a specific sector
 
in the economy and are designed to provide funds and sub­
sidies to these sectors. Commercial banks are an extension
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of the general philosophy of directing credit to important
 
sectors and operate within a framework of highly controlled
 
Other financial institutions have developed
interest rates. 

fill in the voids not served by the larger established
 to 

financial institutions. None of the nation's financial
 
institutions, with the exception of the Korean Housing
 
Bank, seem to have the interest, inclination or resources
 
to provide significant amounts of housing funds at 
the
 
present time. At the same time, the acquiessence 
of the
 
present major financial interests would be necessary if
 
additional financial institutions oriented to 
developing
 
the private market for housing capital were to 
be established.
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TABLE A 
BANKIrNG STRUCTURE IN KOREA 
FINANCIAL DATA AS OF AU(;'1T 1976) 
(in billion woii) 
T ItE B A N K 0 F K 0 R F A 
I1
 JCOMERCIAL BANKS 
L 	 Deposits 1.070 29.9%
61 	 FOREIGN BANK OFFICES
OCLBNS28 KOREA TRUST BANK 

02 

S T..................1 L AL BANKS
SNATIONWIDE CI Y BANKS 

Depost 218 6.1D1.07 Loans 1.257 34.02 52.7X Deposits 218 6.12 	 144 3.9%
Deposits 1.886 	 Loans
9.5%
ans 350
49.3%
Loans 1,821 

TI(E CHASE MANIATA 
oH BAN OF TO Y 
KOF TTN 
CANUNGCHONG BANT

__FIRSTCITY BANK 

• 	 OF KOREAy
 
O'THE 

BANK 
 -- KANIL
KA CJU BANK 
BANQUTH L'INDCH1N
A BANKFLONAC 

Bnk of Korea
Source: F-n.n,.on, Syce in Korea. TT1AN
CAGiNCoUK..ANK 
HE M[H4'-!-k OF FINANCE 
Depootts 1,070 29-9Z
SPE(.IL BANKS
 
ons 1,2,7 34.02
1,27 3.
Loan. 

TH KOREA DJEVELOJPMENT 
THE KO E XCA NGQ 
THE ME D[U P!IN UST Y 1 
NATL.NAL NATIONAL 
T'E C ITIOT B 
TABLE B
 
BANK DEPOSITS
 
B9 Typo or IfLLLuLLon
 
yoor S 
KEY: X Special Banks 
+ Foreign Bank Offices 
The Korean Trust Bank 
O Local Banks 
- Nationwide City Banks 
YEAR 
NATIONWIDE 
CITY BANKS LOCAL BANKS 
KOREA TRUST 
BANK 
FOREIGN BANK 
OFFICES 
SPECIAL 
BANKS TOTAL 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 (Aug.) 
471,360 
569,643 
765,266 
797,622 
1,129,246 
1,523,100 
1,866,403 
32,867 
54,863 
95,281 
146,751 
202,167 
288,151 
363,653 
79,269 
124,831 
158,440 
182,815 
195,650 
186,452 
217,634 
5,540 
6,520 
11,951 
17,058 
17,594 
29,882 
39,157 
285,917 
342,897 
434,705 
578,900 
703,424 
858,847 
1,069,885 
(unit: 
872,953 
1,098,754 
1,465,643 
1,723,146 
2,248,081 
2,886,432 
3,556,732 
million won) 
AVERAGE ANNUALIZED GROWTH RATE 
1970-76 
1974-76 
1975-76 
27.47% 
35.10% 
35.44% 
52,80% 
42.13% 
41.53% 
19.50% 
6.58% 
25.96% 
41.18% 
61.45% 
49.70% 
26.20% 
28.54% 
38.81% 
28.11% 
31.61% 
36.57% 
Source: Monthlv Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 10/76
 
fl 
-o 
17197219570 
KEY: X Special Banks
 
+ Foreign Bank Offices
 
\ The Korean Trust Bank
 
O Local Banks
 
- Nationwide City Banks
 
KOREA TRUST FOREIGN BANK SPECIAL
NATIONWIDE 

LOCAL BANKS BANK OFFICES BANKS TOTAL
 CITY BANKS 

280,658 785,300
 
YEAR 

67,658 4,836
1.970 410,177 21,971 

7,823 351,109 1,018,648
37,085 107,924
1971 514,707 
 455,529 1,289,770
115,482 14,108
1972 645,286 59,365 
 599,966 1,662,650
19,927
1973 818,256 101,884 122,617 
 883,821 2,435,786
114,420 21,662
1974 1,220,333 195,550 

78,687 1,027,672 2,866,960
 1975 1,369,124 277,620 113,857 
 1,257,100 3,695,022
143,928 122,946
1976 (Aug.) 1,820,771 350,277 
 (unit: million won)
 
AVERAGE ANNUALIZED GROWTH RATE
 
30.27% 31.41%
14.25% 76.94%
1970-76 30.08% 63.01% 

41.73% 14.77% 182.82% 23.49% 28.34%
 1974-76 27.10% 
 35.09% 46.04%
41.33% 41.99% 94.66%
1975-76 53.09% 

Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 10/76
Source: 
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-- 
0 
z 
a 
go 
"<EY : X 
+ 

A 

0 

NATTONWIDE 

YEAR CITY BANKS 

1970 971,289 

19711 1,22!0,762 

1072 1,579,949 

1973 2,066,587 

1974 2,798,306 

1975 4,112,112 

1976 (Aug.) 5,325,158 

~~.. .... ii. usr ~ 
TABLE D
 
afKBSiT_. 
BY TYPC Or INSTITUTION
 
Special Banks 
Foreign Bank Offices
 
The Korean Trust Bank
 
Local Banks
 
Nationwide City Banks
 
KOREA TRUST 

LOCALBANKS BANK 
40,682 86,587 
66,215 138,600 
125,614 202,173 
231,195 225,760 
393,130 235,131 
660,980 244,338 
835,2485 305,883 
AVERAGE ANNUALIZED GROWTH RATE(ui:mlonw)
 
1970-76 35.02% 70.45% 25.0% 
t974-76 47.10% 57.20% 17.10% 
1975-*/6 47.40% 42.10% 40.00% 
FOREIGN BANK 

OFFICES 

14,958 

-27,340 

52,839 

95,689 

120,424 

259,822 

352,505 

65.6% 

90.5% 

58.0% 

SPECIAL 
BANKS TOTAL 
1,192,195 
1,457,772 
1,738,669 
2,264,112 
2,654,565 
3,199,956 
3,747,500 
2,305,711 
2,901,689 
3,699,244 
4,883,543 
6,201,556 
8,477,208 
10,566,331 
22.4% 
23.0% 
31.6% 
30.8% 
37.6% 
38.9% 
Source: Monthly Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea
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The Korean Housing Bank
 
The Korean Housing Bank was established for the purpose
 
low income families. The
of providing housing funds for 

1976 is shown
balance sheet of the Bank as of October 19, 

in the bank are approximately
Present resources
in Table 17. 

208 billion won with the bulk of the bank's assets, 70.1%,
 
Both the deposit and loan
 committed in the housing area. 

An examination
 
structure of Korean Housing Bank is complex. 

of the bank's sources of funds reveals a multitude of
 
approaches to the raising of deposit funds.
 
Korean Housing Bank Sources of Funds
 
sources of
The Korean Housing Bank has five major 

deposits, housing debentures, national housing
funds: 

bonds, housing lottery funds, and borrowings from the
 
Table 19 indicates the growth
government (Table 18). 

As Table 20 shows,
in funds for the period 1970-1975. 

the total funds raised in 1975 was 42.3 billion won, a
 
somewhat lower increase than had been anticipated by 
the
 
sources will
A more detailed description of these
bank. 

indicate the types of approaches which the Housing 
Bank
 
has used in attempting to tap the money and capital 
markets.
 
Deposits
 
Table 21 shows the breakdown of the deposits held
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by the bank. As the table shows, there are 15 ca :g ries.
 
interest o iecking
Interest rates on deposits range from no 

deposits to an interest rate of 33.2% for certain low
 
income contract savings programs. The Korean Housing Bank
 
has attracted substantial amounts of funds even at very
 
low interest rates. The deposits of 11.6 billion won
 
in the pass book account having an interest rate of 1.8%
 
provides a good example of this phenomena.
 
a great
It is evident from the table that there is 

proliferation of savings accounts, many of which seem
 
to duplicate one another in their effect. Savings accounts
 
which pay a significant rate of interest seem to generally
 
have restrictions on withdrawal of funds or require a
 
minimum time period before withdrawal can take place.
 
Two types of account, the low income contract savings
 
and the Housing Installment Deposit are of particular
 
The low income contract savings program officially
interest. 

called the Salary and Wage Earners Fortune Formation Savings
 
Deposit is a plan available at the Housing Bank designed
 
to promote savings among lower income workers. The account
 
involves the participation of government and the employer
 
each contributing a portion of the interest paid on the
 
account. The interest rates on the savings plans are:
 
2 Year 3 Year 5 Year 
Bank 13.2% 14.2% 16.2% 
Government 10.6% 10.0% 12.0% 
Employer (voluntary) 1.9% 2.6% 2.9% 
Source: Korea Housing Bank 
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The depositor makes a fixed monthly deposit of up to 30%
 
The government contribution comes
of his monthly income. 

from the depositor's irjome tax and is given to the KHB
 
who holds it at the Bank of Korea until maturity when it
 
The employer's contribution
is given to the depositor. 

is voluntary and is made to the bank at the discretion
 
of the employer. In practice, employers have been reluctant
 
Workers are eligible for the
 to contribute to the fund. 

program only if they make under 250,000 won per month 
or
 
under 16,000 won per day for workers without a contract.
 
Overseas workers can contribute if they make under 500,000
 
won/month. Balances in the program at the Korean Housing
 
Bank were 7.6 billion won on November 6, 1976. Thirty
 
percent of the 7.6 billion won is authorized for 
housing.
 
The program, while innovative and providing attractive
 
co­
interest rates, is hindered by its complexity and 
the 

operation required from three completely diverse 
entities.
 
The actual effective interest rates on these accounts 
are
 
actually somewhat lower than indicated because 
of the method
 
of computation.
 
Another approach to raising funds is the Housing 
Installment
 
a contract savings deposit connected with
 Deposit (HID), 

a housing
 
a housing loan. The depositor is able to apply 
for 

There
 
loan after a specified period of monthly deposits. 

The "GAP", which
 
are two types of HIDs currently in use. 

is for financing of housing improvement and purchasing,
 
has only 3% of the total HID accounts despite 
its higher
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yield (compared to 9% for EUL) because a loan can be obtained
 
sooner with the "EUL". The "EUL" finances mainly owmer­
occupied housing construction. A new form of HID is the
 
Welfare Housing Installment Deposit which operates for
 
financing house and housing site purchases, and housing
 
construction.
 
Housing Debenture
 
The KHB issues government guaranteed housing debentures
 
to raise additional funds for housing. They can be
 
issued in the amount up to 20 times capital and reserves.
 
Through the end of 1975, the balance was 16.3 billion
 
won and on October 1976, this balance has been reduced
 
to 14.7 hillion won. The debenture is tax exempt and
 
can be used as a bid bond or deposit money. Denominations
 
range from 500 to 1,000,000 won and maturities from
 
two to three years.
 
Table 19 shows the balance of KHB debentures by
 
year. Despite an increase in the annual discount rate
 
both in 1975 and 1976 the balance outstanding decreased
 
15% in 1975 and another 10% during 1976.
 
National Housing Funds
 
In addition to the private sources of funds and access
 
to the capital market the housing bank has access to govern­
ment or government sponsored funds. These funds include
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borrowing from the government and the National Housing
 
Bond.
 
low interest, compulsory
National Housing Bonds are 

purchase bonds, the proceeds of which are used by the Korean
 
Housing Bank for housing finance. Individuals or businesses
 
entering into certain types of activities such as real
 
estate registration, building and contruction permits,
 
obtaining business licenses, etc., must purchase a specified
 
Since inflation reduces
amount of national housing bonds. 

the real value of the bonds they essentially impose a tax
 
their current rate of interest
 on the purchaser inasmuch as 

Face value of the bond ranges from
is only six percent. 

thousand to one million won and the maturity of the
 one 

Because of the low interest rates
issues is five years. 

there are virtually no voluntary purchases of this bond.
 
a function of the amount
The amount which can be sold is 

of activity taking place which requires bcnd purchases
 
and the ratio of required bond purchases to the amount
 
of activity to be undertaken. The amount of these bonds
 
annual basis can be assumed to grow at the
issued on an 

For the first five
 same rate as the national economy. 

years, ending in 1978, all proceeds from these issues represent
 
a net addition to the housing funds available. Beginning
 
in 1978, the first bond maturities must be repaid. From
 
that time forward, the net addition to housing funds will
 
issued
be limited to the difference between the amount 

the Korean economy is assumed
and the amount retired. If 
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to have a real rate of growth of 10% and if it is assumed
 
that the issuance of National Housing Bonds matches this
 
growth rate then the amount of funds available from this
 
source over the next few years will be as follows:
 
(000,000 won)* 
Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Amount 
Issued 18,168 .9,985 21,983 24,182 26,600 29,260 
Amount 
Redeemed 0 0 0 9,342 14,601 18,168 
Net Increase 
in Housing 
Funds 18,168 19,985 21,983 14,835 11,999 11,092 
*EPB figures are somewhat higher but exhibit a similar pattern. 
If this growth pattern were to continue, the annual amount
 
of funds raised would stabilize at only 38% of the gross
 
amount of housing bonds issued.
 
Housing Lottery
 
The housing lottery raises funds for low interest
 
low income and homeless
loans to families of war dead or 

17.3 billion
people. Since the first lottery in 1969, 

won has been raised, resulting in 7 billion won (40.4%)
 
of loanable funds. The balance of housing lottery funds
 
has grown annually at 35% (Table 19) over the past 3 years
 
and has, since inception, kept up with projected receipts
 
The growth in lottery funds has been rapid during
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the early years of the housing lottery. The long term
 
outlook for lottery funds is more guarded. The most 
optimistic
 
outlook for the lottery may be to anticipate a real 
growth
 
In
 
of funds matching the economic growth of the nation. 

the event that the housing lottery is unusually successful
 
in the economy.

the funds may be siphoned off to other uses 

Borrowings from the Government
 
In 1975, the Bank borrowed 2.0 billion won from the
 
government, repayable in 15 years with 5 years 
grace period
 
This is only the second loan on which
 at 4% interest. 

In 1973, the Bank borrowed
 the Bank is paying interest. 

2.6 billion won at 2% per year. All other loans, 
although 
repayable, require no interest. Total loans from 
government 
exceed 12 billion won. 
The government of Korea has made wide use of the 
low
 
(or no) interest rate loans to support socially desirable
 
projects. The continued support which the housing bank
 
source will be determined by the priority
 may expect from this 

which the government attaches to housing as opposed 
to
 
There does not appear to
 other sectors of the economy. 

exist a present program to substantially increase 
government
 
provided capital to the Housing Bank.
 
Mortgaae Lending in the Korean Housing Bank
 
The Korean Housing Bank makes several types 
of loans
 
which can generally be broken down into seven 
categories
 
The bulk of these loans is accounted
 shown in Table 22. 
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for by National Housing Loans which comprise 39.2% of the
 
Bank's portfolio and private housing loans comprising
 
These two types of loans, in addition
46.1% of the portfolio. 

to having the largest loan balances, have also represented
 
The Bank of
the highest rate of growth in recent years. 

source
Korea provides its loans partially according to the 

of funds from which the loans are made. Loans are made
 
either from government funds or from the banking fund.
 
Loans made from the government fund bear lower interest
 
true
rate than loans made from private funds. This is 

some
 
even though loans made from government funds may in 

cases be for larger homes and higher income households
 
than is true for a particular loan made from private funds.
 
Table 23 provides an extensive breakdown of the loans
 
This table
presently held by the Korean Housing Bank. 

provides information concerning the loan and its purpose,
 
source of funds, other terms concerning the loan and the
 
total amount of loans outstanding.
 
The weighted average return on all loans is 11.0%
 
This rate is low given the level of
as of October 1976. 

price increase in the Korean economy and the low rates
 
will diminish the amount of mortgage capital recovered.
 
Assuming inflation is reduced to 10.64% over the next five
 
years as predicted by the fourth five year plan (which
 
is optimistic in view of past experience), an 11.0% loan
 
would barely recover the real value of the capital. This
 
leaves no compensation for risk, cost of capital, or banking
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charges. This situation is likely to be associated with
 
a chwl ic sho't-ane of capital. 
The only real requirement for a loan is that the borrower 
must have a site to be used as collateral. The collateral
 
value of the land plus the relatively high downpayment
 
takes the place of a credit check. There are no age, occu­
pation, income, or marital limitations. There is a nominal
 
condition that the borrower be homeless, but this not always
 
carefully monitored. Under a situation such as this, it
 
is difficult to determine the extent to which the Bank 
is achieving its goal of providing funds to low income 
families. 
The lack of specific control over who obtains loans 
combined with the chronic capital shortage and great demand
 
for low interest loans can reduce the effectivene.!s of
 
the Bank. The possibility exists that funds could be misused.
 
Borrowers could arbitrage these funds into higher interest
 
rate markets. There is no rigorous attempt to determine
 
the degree of need among potential borrowers and therefore
 
no way to assume that the government subsidv given through
 
the loans is distributed in a rational manner.
 
Outlook and Recommendations fcr the Korea Housina Bank 
The Korea Housing Bank has been able to assemble a
 
fairly inexpensive pool. of funds. Deposits cost only 10.9%
 
per year, housing lottery funds are virtually free, the
 
National Housing Bond costs the Bank only 6%, and the govern­
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on their funds. While
interest
ment requires little or no 

the use of these low cost funds,
 the Bank relies heavily on 

it is not clear that such funds will continue 
to be available.
 
even in light of increased returns,
Housing Debenture Funds, 

last two years.
have declined 3% per year over the 
The
 
hoped and
not selling as well as 
National Housing Bond is 

the fourth five year plan predicts a decline in 
funds from
 
to
 
this source. Increases in the fund will largely 
come 

an end in 1978 without an increase in purchase requirements.
 
Proceeds from bond purchases after 1978 will be used 
to
 
to cover loans already out­retire outstanding bonds and 

The total amount of funds which can be generated
standing. 

from the Housing Lottery are clearly limited and 
any strong
 
the part of the government to increase the
 endeavor on 

populace' participation in lotteries must stabilize 
with
 
to the general growth in the
 perhaps modest growth equal 

The net increase in government funds
 national economy. 

of the national
1.7 billion won, 0.4%
for housing in 1975 was 

investment in housing and only 5% cf the increase 
in the
 
This relatively small government contribution
 Bank's capital. 

to housing would have to increase substantially to 
have
 
impact on the housing fund situation. These funds 
are
 
an 

they are low
 highly attractive to the Housing Bank as 

in many cases they virtually
interest, long term loans and 

have amounted to a grant to the Bank. While these 
funds
 
are highly useful, the Bank has very little control over
 
funds which the government will supply and
 the amount of 
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it is unlikely that the qov'ornmnt will be willinqi to serve 
.I! ZI Conl1tinulU . 1.o iq I-kil st13 I1t -'kibC 11ucholl'Sitt fI~tl .;. 
The other major source of funds which the Korean Housing 
Bank has is its deposits. This is the most successful 
and fastest growing source of housing funds at the Bank.
 
There is much more potential in raising funds through deposits
 
than any other method now employed. The Bank must be
 
allowed interest rates on its deposits which will allow
 
funds from the private sector
for the attracting of adequate 

be expected to generate the increased
if the Bank is to 

amount of housing funds which the economy will require.
 
an increase in interest rates will necessarily
Although 

loans, the existence
result in higher interest rates on 

the curb market would indicate that the availability
of 

to

of money is more important than its cost. In addition 

drawing in more housing funds, higher interest rates would
 
solve the capitalization problem by improving the recovery
 
of capital on mortgage loans. The Bank will face two major
 
First,
problems in implementing a program of this type. 

the fact that interest rates are set nationally for all
 
banks by the monetary board and other government regulatory
 
structure of interest
authorities. Second, the fact that the 

rates on mortgages does not provide adequate income to
 
support the deposit rates which would presently attract
 
funds in the Korean economy.
 
The Bank should consider the feasibility of simplifying
 
its deposits into a few major accounts to replace the
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Sproliferation 
p r~o ] ip 
of shortltermW low 
A ' 
interest rat~e ac6count; 
,r, 
'V "~ 
,A 'A1>41{ "%> 51'Y' 
These accoIuntssol be as convenienb for the depositor '<4V 
5,IiIi ias p'o sib1e. It may be that most of 
5the 1account's, -suach 
athe children's deposits, passbook deposit call deposi.ts-, 
A<5 Ai':i . 
household deposit, wel-fare deposit and others could be 
repliced by one or two ty'pes of accounts. Most of
5 the 
-dEi56i  otvibt-s-,,--pec-ified--mi'ght be-replacedby ~a--sipe---­
pass book ty unt yielding perhaps 8-10% interest, 
'5 
having a modest minimum balance, no maximum balance and 
which could be withdrawn at the pleasure of the depositor. 
The deposit would receive interest from the date it was 
doposited to the date it was withdrawn. Simplifying the 
savings account structure in this manner would reduce the 
work- load of the bank and would reduce the confusion on 
the part of savers wishing to place money with the 1L,.nk. 
An account of this nature should increase the ability 
of the housing' bank to attract short term funds because 
ot the simplicity of the account and the attractiveness 
of having no m'inimum maturity for the savings account. 
It also appears feasible and attractive to offer a simple -
set of time deposits ranging in maturity from three months 
to something in the range of two to three years with interest 
penalties for withdrawal. such time deposits should be" 
set at rates which will allow: the bank' to attract a sig-
A nificant amount of housing funds. As of late 1976,1, suchm~~ s 
time deposits might be reasonably successful" with interest 
rates ranging from 16 to 20 'percent. A' general simplification 
5 A 5 5 ie i ~! 55i S£ ' Ieihb 
'1 
s''A','Ag!i::i''5' 
55 
5! A 
~i 
-76-. 
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''A" 
of the deposit accounts at the bank would appear to increase
 
its effectiveness and its efficiency. Based on the preceding
 
recommendations, the bank might offer a product line of
 
financial instruments composed of checking account demand
 
deposits, a simple pass book account bearing a significant
 
rate of interest, a time deposit structured from three
 
months to three years maturity, and housing debentures
 
sold in the one, two and three year maturity range at market
 
interest rates.
 
modifications such as this in connection with improved
 
control over who receives the benefits of Korean Housing
 
Bank loans would areatly improve the effectiveness of the
 
low income families.Bank in providing adequate funds for 
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TABLE 17
 
KOREA HOUSING BANK BALANCE SHEET
 
OCTOBER 1976
 
(Million Won)
 
ASSETS 

Cash and Due from Banks 

Securities 

Loans and Discounts 

Housing Loans 

Banking Funk 

Government Funk 

Loans Other Than Housing 

Call Loans 

Personal and Real Estate 

TOTAL 

LIABILITIES
 
Dopos its 

Demand 
Time and Savings 

Housing installment 

Banks 

Borrowinqs from Government 

Hlousing Debentures 

National Hlousing Bond 

AMOUNT PERCENT 
18,327 8.8 
12,111 5.8 
159,804 76.8 
145,844 70.1 
137,041 65.8 
8,803 4.2 
13,960 6.7 
3,000 1.4 
5,767 2.8 
208,156 100.0 
88,262 42.4 
27,864 13.4 
48,832 23.5 
10,693 5.1 
873 .4 
12,110 5.8 
14,688 7.1 
57,374 27.8 
Special Financial Debentures Issued 928 .4 
i1,7n7 5.6Capital 795 .4Retaie.cd Earnings 
2,772 1.3Profit 
8,140 3.9
Paid in Capital 

208,156 100.0
TOTAL 

Economic Statistics, Bank of Korea, Oct. 1976
 Source: Monthly 
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1ORLA H'* , BANK 
Sources aivd Use.4 of F,.ids and Typcs of ;.oans 
Type of loan, Terms, and Maximum
Korea ilousing Bank Ilousing N.,rket 

II.,meSize
By Source of Funds 

II. 	 O'fRI.l¢Uther loans. 4% within the period of borrowing firm the govt 
National Ito.liug Constrction Loan 8Z 15 yearb 25 pyong 
Public Ilousing Construction Loan 82 15 years no limit 
NATIONAl. HOUSING FUND 
LOC'AL ,OVE..Mi..r 	 Public Housing Construction Loan 9% 15 years To limit 
National 
GOVERNMENT FUNDS 

lousing Lottery Loan 4Z 20 years 25 pyong 
- I-Housing Lottery Fund Loan 4% 25 years no limit 
AID Counterpart Funds 
HOUSI NG LOTTERY
 
FNiHC 	 Public Housing Construction Loan 8% 15 years 15 pyong
 
Loans for Sale of Apartments 8Z 15 years no limit
 
NATIONAL HOUSING BONDS 
AID FUNDS 	 AID Guaranty Loan 9.52 25 years 13 pyong
 
ER BANKING FUNDS PRIATGNational Housing Construction Loan 8% 15 years 25 pyong 
Private Enterprise Ilousing Construc­
tion Loan 15.5% 11 years 25 pyong 
HOUSING DEBENTURE 	 "INDIVI-UAIS - - Private llourting Cottstruction Loan 14% 20 years 
25 pyong 
/ IPrivate 	 Housing Construction Loan 14Z 20 years 25 pyong 
K /National housing Site Development 8% 2 years 25 pyong 
______________________Loan 
1atiotal Housing Construction Loan 81 1 year 25 pyonR 
DEPOSIT tlousing Site Developmeut Loan 17% 3 years ro I ltd t 
Private Housing Builders Loan 17% 3 years 25 pyong 
HOUSING INSTALLMEIT, 
OTHER_______ 	 Bills Di!3counted Loan 17% 90 days 
Overdraft l.oan 18% 30 days
DEMAND. TIME, D 
SEAINSDEITANAInstallment 	 Savings Deposit Loans 15-17% Within deposit
SAVINGS DEPOSITS 
 Maturity 
17% 1 yearCommercinl Loans
ENTEIPRISE 'rRIUCTI. 
Special Term Loan for Enterprise 8% 7 years 
Financial Structure Improvement 
Source : Korea llousincl Bank 
'IABLh 19 
l~- litr i|'"nI e,9W;It 1 	 I,I 
'lll I1:1,; I I'INI'; 
C, 
0 
SEI{ 
XPaid in Capital and Reserves 
+ Borrowings from Government
 
&x Housing Debenture 
0 National Housing Bond 
- Deposits
 
Paid in Borrowings National
 
Capital and from the Housing Housing
 
Bond DepositsYear Reserves Government Debenture 
-- 17,706
1970 5,671 2,800 8,095 

11,586 -- 23,753
1,971 6,049 5,800 

1972 6,381 7,714 16,027 --- 33,147
 
1.973 6,417 10,270 19,734 10,425 	 44,515
 
1974 	 6,655 10,237 19,238 25,008 54,829
 
67,143
1975 6,775 12,170 16,319 43,500 

1976 (Aug.) 8,935 12,110 14,688 57,894 	 88,262
 
Source: 'MonthlyEconomic Statistics, Bank of Korea, 10/76
 
KHB Annual Report 1975
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TABLE 20
 
KHB YEARLY SOURCES OF FUNDS
 
A B 
Year Projected Actual B/A% 
1970 9,000 11,361 126.2% 
1971 15,592 14,563 91.3% 
1972 26,784 28,562 106.5% 
1973 29,703 29,414 99.3% 
1974 36,391 35,503 97.6% 
1975 49,311 42,342 85.9% 
Source: KHB Annual Reports, 1970-1975
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MAXIMU4 A1UN:,NAIE OF DEPOSITS 

Checking deposits 

Temporary Dcposlts 

Pashook1.8% 

Pulpi i eposits1.8 
CallDepoit~s2-Note 

Call Deposits 

100,00 won 

Childrens Depostt' 

3,000.000 won 
Household Deposits 

1.000,000 won 
Household Savings Deposits 

Low Income Contract Savings 

within 30% of 
5 year plan 

monthly incone 
3 year plan 

max. 50.000 Won 
2 year plan 

Welfare Deposits 

Time deposits 

HaturiLy 
ater 1-2.5 years 

Maturity after 6 months 

Maturity after 3 months 

B Irregular maturity after 1 yr 

After 6 months 

After 3 months 

to 1.5 yrs
C Transferable after 1 
After 6 months 
3 months
 
After 

1) Time Deposits drawn midway 
I year 

6 months 

I months 

1 month 

National Savings Association Deposits 

Installment Savings Deposits 

1 
1.5 
2 
2.5I 
DEHt)SITS 
I:EI""T RATE 
It 

b6 

6% 

5.9658% 

18% 

33.22 

27.2% 

25.8% 

3.6Z 

16.2% 

15.6% 

15%
15.6% 

15.0% 

15.0% 

14.4% 
15.6% 

15.0" 

6.0% 

1.8Z 

12.6% 

9% 
11.2% 
11.7% 

12.2% 

12.7% 

13.2Z 

-Al. ' 2 1 
AT "it1 t(I ID i t!OIJIl 
2U 197~lll(I}6 
DI 1IT I'.tM 
1 year 

5 years 

3 yeats 

2 years 

1-1.5 yrs 1 

6 months I 
2
 
3 imoths 1
1 year
 
2
 
6 months
 
2
 
6 months
 
23 monthH
3
 
3 
1 year 
6 months 
3 months
 
I monti
 
5 years 

6 months 
1 year
 
1.5 years
 
2 years
 
2.5 years 
3 years 
'C.i
 
BAI.AI-CE 
1.222.dnb.227
 
4,578,92i.02u 

11.638,956.380 

424,958,704 

1,155,766.537 

269,162.072 

4,896,681,273 

4,621.524,069 

6,394,057,000 

812,801,00(1 

4,970,052,500
 
116,813,000
 
212,592.356 

NOTES
 
for settlement of cahsier's
 Deposit of fund 

checks and others.
 
Passbook type
 
Local government deposit raised by 
receiving
 
charges for electricity and water supply
 
type 30 days with advance 14tice
 I-Withdrawable over 

tax
 
Passbook type, exempt from income 

Passbook type
 
Exempt from Income tax, note type
 
Exempt from income tax and donation 
tCa
 
Passbook type
 
Passbook type, interest pays an insurance 
premiun
 
32,932,538,018 1,2,3 Note type
 1 to 1.5 years
20,634 million won 

as of Sept 30
 6,031 million won 6 months 

9,466 million won 3 months
 
Exempt from income tax, passbook type
50,194,887 

TAFL..' 21 (CccIt.) 
DEPOSIUIS Al IhhI. r'YrA':* IIUOISINC: BANK 
20 0U-1OBEk 1976 
NAME OF DEPOSITS HAXiHUH ANLUNT INTEREST RATE JEI'0,J'IT rERM BALANCE NOTES 
1HousIng Installme±nt Savings 
deposits 
Class (GAP) 2-5 yrs 
Class (EUI.) 
1,000.000 won 15% 
9z 
3-5 years 
20 years 
Linked with housing loans, depositors receive 
a contracted amount of wmney and housing loans 
at maturity or pre-maturity. 
Credit Control Deposits 2Z lower 
than loan 
3.479,581,311 Deposit for compensation of bad debts. 
Passbook type 
Interest 
Source: Korea Housing Bank 
ta) 
LI 
TABLE 22
 
WW(*fIIIOLPVNG VANK 
LOANS OUTSTANDING
 
JJ 
-J 
i ---9----­
0x + 0 
Commer- Lottery 
Private National cial Public Fund Enterprise 
Year Housing Housing Loan Housing Other Raising Structure Total 
1970 
1971 
18,980 
27,861 
3,124 
4,471 
4,235 
4,474 
847 
338 
185 
492 
27,371 
37,636 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
29,092 
49,277 
53,053 
60,834 
8,285 
28,581 
51,790 
4,396 
7,599 
7,065 
9,351 
5,222 
4,996 
5,627 
5,402 
3,136 
2,840 
2,440 
2,423 
1,012 
1,311 
1,276 
1,240 
1,117 
1,077 
1,060 
1,034 
53,975 
75,385 
99,102 
132,074 
5 Year 
Growth 
Rate 26.23% 150.02% 24.52% 4.99% 23.39% 46.30% -2.54% 36.85% 
(2 year) (4 year) 
Source: KHB 9th Annual Report, pg 63 
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IVA8IE 2 3 
KOREA 1ItlJSIG BANK |.UAllS 
NAME OF LOAN AND PURPOSE 
NAMT OFLOANAND 
SOURCE 
PURPOSE 
OF FUND MAXIMUM 
ou.-ooBF:R 1976 
AMT. LOAN/VALUE 
KAIIORATE 
MATURITY GRACE PERIOD 
ANNUAL 
INTEREST 
IiAXIMUIi 
HOUSE SIZE 
REQUIREMEJIT 
TIAI. AOUNT 
OUTSTANDING (WON) 
National tiousing Site 
Development Loan 
This loan Is advanced 
to housing site deve!oper 
for housing sites of 12,000 
02 sultable for housing 
const ructiotn. 
Banking Fund 
lousilng Debentures 
80Z of the 
construction 
cu!.t 
2 years 8% 85 M
2 924,798.750 
National Housing Construction 
Loan 
This loan Is advanced to 
contractors who build housing 
units for sale or rent. 
2,000,000 per 
household 
80% of the 
construction 
cost 
1 year 82 85 *2 7,30',200,000 
Housing Site Development Loan 
T11s loani is advanced to 
housing site developers 
Deposits 70% 2 years 
17% 566,000 
Private Housiug Builder Loan 
This loan Is advanced to 
contracturs who build houses 
fur sale or rent 
Deposits 60% 3 years 17% 85 *2 1,861,773.061 
Natlolial Housing Construction Loan 
This loan is available to those 
other than contractors who build 
houses for sale 
National Housing I.otery Fund L.oan Housing 
Lottery 
2.000,000 
1,200,000 
80% 14 years 
80% of the 19 years 
construction 
cost 
I year 
I year 
82 
42 
85 w2 
85 02 
54,681,431.675 
7,061.130.574 
Private Housing Construction Loan 
This loan Is advanced to those 
who build or purchase their own 
home. Downpayment requirement 
is 145,000 won 
Deposits detached 
house-
1,800,000 
ap a r t me n t 
2.200,000 
80% of the 19 years 
construction & 6 months 
cost 
14% 85 2 67,976,436.7L9 
Private Enterprise 
tion Loan 
tousilng Construc- 2,000.000 80% of the 
construction 
cost 
8 years 3 years 1,5.5 85 a2 861.988,700 
r tAI : .!: 3 ( - . ) 
-IEA h.IJ!!tL,ANYio[.",-
OucrItER 1976 
ANN4UAL MAX' HUM 
INTEREST IlOUSE SIZE TOTAl. AMOUNT MAY.1fH AHT. I.AN/VALUE MTURITY GRACE PERIOD NAHE OF RATEL.OANAND PURPOSE SuURCL uF 
FUND REUIJ 1HEENT OUTSTAN) I NG -(WN) 
RATIO _ 
917.743,7-1615 yearsj 	 8z 
177437,6
5 years 	 % 

Public Housing Construction Loan 
1,205.198,.208
25 years 	 4ZFund 	 Hloustng LotteryIlusilln Lottery Loan 
85 *2 2,228. 40.048Cte 14 years 1 year 8Z 
Natlonal ousing Construction Government Fund 	 80U of ion I~oanconstruct 
Loun 	 cost
 
2 2,412.015.970
 
802 of the 19 years 6 months 14Z 
85 m 
c.onstructon & 6 monthsPrivate 1lousnr Constrction Loan 
This loan Is advanced to those 
cost
 
who build or purchase their
 
own home
 
Public liousing Cunstruction Loan 
B0% of the 14 years I year 82Thlas loan is advanced to local 
 construc tion
 
government 

cost
 
549.041.461 
Public Ilousing Construction Loan AID Counter- 14 years 1 year 8,
part fund 

2.413.627,0004%
Within theAll Counter-

Government Fund
Other Loans Originated from part fund period of borrowing 
from govt 
Special Term loan for Enterprise Banking 
Fund
 
Financial Structure Improvement
 
in 5 years
 
Special Long term Loans for 

Enterprise Financial Structure Banking Fund
Improvement

Bills Discounted I~an Banking Fund 10 million 70Z of cost 90 days 17% 283.791,54H
 
nted Loanneeded
hills Muco 

1.031,498,239
18%
70Z of cost 30 days
15 million needed
 
Overdraft Loan 
 Banking 
Fund 

2.597.370.407
17Z
70z of cost Within the 
Banking Fund 

Installment Savings Deposits 	 needed maturity of
 
Loan 	 tone deposit 
70% of cost Within the 15%
Loans on Installment Savings Banking Fund 
Deoisneeded 	 naturtty of 
the deposit 1 26,667 22 4821 
176
70Z of cost I year
Banking Fund 10 million
Commercial Loans 
 needed 
Sourt:e: Korea ilousing Bank 
348.114.000 
The Korean National Housing Corporation
 
The Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHC) is a
 
government owned corporation whose purpose it is to supply,
 
finance, improve and manage housing to help reduce the
 
housinq shortage in Korea. Since 1962, KNHC has built
 
86,000 units, providing homes for 430,000 people.
 
Table 24
 
Korean National Housing Corporation
 
YEARLY CONSTRUCTION
 
YEAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS (UNITS) YEAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS (UNITS)
 
YEARLY CONSTRUCTION 

1969 1239
1962 1558 

1970 2423
1963 907 

1L164 1026 1971 1845
 
1972 2290
1065 580 

1973 5190
1966 1062 

10,152
1967 1407 1974 

811 1975 18,498
1968 

1976 26,076
 
The principle target group for the KNHC is the low
 
income populace, but they do supply some housing for middle
 
and upper income groups as well.
 
The basic direction of KNHC is to:
 
reduce the downpayments of occupants,
 
emphasize construction in satellite cities, industrial
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cities and local areas for population deconcentration,
 
conduct research and assist in the urbanization programs
 
and squatter up-grading projects of local governments.
 
The KNHC operates under the direction of the MOC who
 
supervises in consultation with the MOF. These ministries
 
the KNHC in the carrying out of Korean Government Housing
use 

is
Policy. The thrust of these government policies and laws 

raise maximum amounts of private capital to he invested in
to 

housing, increase public sector investment, give low income
 
groups priority in obtaining public housing, and to create
 
areas of great demand such as rapidly growing
housing sites in 

areas sc as to stabilize the escalating land costs.
urban 

The impact of KNHC on the nation in implementing these
 
covernment policies is limited in that KNHC contributes less
 
the national investment in
than three-tenths of one percent of 

housing.
 
Construction of all housing projects is oerformed
 
by private contractors, selected through competitive bidding.
 
KNHC provides many of their materials to reduce cost.
 
Cost control is a principle goal of the KNHC. The
 
They
corporation conducts much research in this area. 

own three subsidiaries which make housing materials to
 
Table 25 shows the cost of apartments
further reduce costs. 

from 1971-1975. Costs of the 13 pyong apartments have
 
only been raised by 17.55% since 1971. This is slightly
 
less than the rate of inflation. The cost of the 15 pyong
 
unit actually declined 16% from 1974 to 1975 as shown in Table 25.
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nrices fluctuate + Q' between the cities. 
Th' KNIIC his ',.ip it of W rin won%it hori",ed a I IiiI I it 
of which 23 bill ion is paid in. Personnel stands at 1,3013. 
Sources of Funds
 
Table 26 displays sources and uses of KNHC funds.
 
There are five major sources of KNHC funds: profits from
 
operations, AID guarantee loans, Korea housing bank funds,
 
direct government contributions, and private money from
 
purchasers.
 
KNIIC profits accounted for 24.8% of funds used in
 
1976. These profits come from activities such as site
 
development, foreicners' rental apartments, successful
 
biddinr for store construction, and middle and hiqh income
 
low income housing.
croup housing. No orofit is made on 

The first AID guarantee loan was granted in 1973.
 
and was used in construction
It amounted to $10 million 

of a very successful trial housing project for which appli-

On the basis of
cations exceeded units for sale by 10-1. 

this success, three more loans amounting to 70 million
 
In 1976,
dollars were extended between 1973 and 1975. 

in 1977. The
a 10 million dollar loan was made for use 

KNHC is proceeding with future plans under the assumption
 
of receiving another 25 million dollars in loans for 1977
 
projects. AID loans 6dcounted for 6.9% of KNHC resources
 
in 1976.
 
The Korean Housing Pank provided 12.9 percent of 1976
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operating funds with money raised through the housing lottery
 
20 years at 4%
and the Housing Bond. Terms of these loans are 

and 15 years at 8% respectively.
 
9.7% of KNHC resources
Government funding amounted to 

Most of this came from a direct government subsidy
in 1976. 

with no obligation to repay. This subsidy amounted to 7.5
 
total funds.million won in 1976 or 7.2% of KNHC 
Forty-six percent of construction costs in 1976 came from the
 
private sector in the form of down payments, key money,
 
or security funds for rental units.
 
Uses of Funds
 
Table 27 exhibits housing construction completed in
 
1976 by size and financing plan. There are five major
 
uses of funds: AID auarantee loan apartments, National
 
IIous i ci apartments entrusted by other agencies, shopping
 
conters and work started in the latter half of the year.
 
shows the sales price and mortgage terms
Table 28 

of units built by National Housing and AID funds. AID
 
guarantee loan apartments were the smallest and among the
 
most inexpensive built by KNHC in 1976. This reflects the
 
lowest income group possible.
effort by AID to reach the 

Size ranged from 7.5 to 13 pyong with average cost ranging
 
from 2.20 to 2.76 million won. Average downpayments for
 
these homes were also the lowest for any homes built by
 
to 52 percent. Interest on the loans
KNHC ranging from 38 

are 9.5% repayable in 25 years, including 9.5 years arace
 
-90­
period (when only interest is paid) and 15 years during
 
which interest and principle are paid in level monthly
 
payments.
 
According to the 1976 survey of owners of 13 pyong
 
AID apartments, 74% of the people who responded had an income
 
40,000 to 49,999 won per month (45,000 will be used for
 
Average sales price for these apartments
computations). 

in 1976 was 2.8 million won. The downpayment for these
 
to 46% of cost with a mortgage
apartments ranged from 25% 

for the balance. Payments for the first 9 1/2 years grace
 
of the occupant's monthly income
period range from 34 to 24% 

to 31% of monthly
with the 15 year mortgage payment at 44% 

income.
 
KNIIC wereForty-four percent of the units built by 
from 13 to 25 oyonc.national housino units ranqinq il, size 

Of these, 61% were rental units. The 13 pyong units were
 
the lowest price National Housing apartments with an averaqe
 
cost of 2.7 million won. All of the lottery funds, the
 
government capital contribution, the security fund for rental,
 
and one third of KNHC's own funds went to build these units.
 
Rent on these units is such that KNHC makes no profit.
 
After one year, tenants are expected to purchase the units
 
or leave. A very high proportion of them have been purchased.
 
to 25 pyong and are amonq
Apartments for sale range from 13 

the
the most expensive built by KNHC. Twenty-one percent Df 

inits built fall into this zategory and recuire 47% of
total KNMC 
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KNHC funds to be built. Average downpayments range from
 
47% to 81% of purchase price, somewhat higher than the
 
The balance is financed with
downpayment for AID homes. 

proceeds from the housing bond at 8% for 15 years. The
 
typical method of repayment of these loans under the Korean
 
to pay a constant portion of the principal each
system, is 

Thus, the payment
period and interest on the unpaid balance. 

is not a level payment, but is a decreasing payment. Sale
 
of these units contributes to the KNHC profits, which provided
 
of the funds
24.8% of the total funds used in 1976 and 45% 

used on low income rental housing. Construction of these
 
units also helps reduce the housing shortage by indirectly
 
providing more low income housing by vacating previously
 
owned dwellings. Construction of larger homes not only
 
to make profits which are used. in subsidizing
enables the KNHIC 

low income housing, but it provides a diversity of income
 
groups in housing project areas which helps solve many
 
social problems that could result from a large number
 
of low income households in one area.
 
Outlook for the KNHC
 
The KNHC has been successful in past efforts to spearhead
 
the nation's low income housing effort. Continuation of these efforts
 
depends on a continued source of reliable funds. Profits,
 
which comprised 25% of funds used in 1976, are a good source
 
of low cost funds and are made from aartment units and
 
stores which help upgrade KNHC housing settlements. Foreign
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funds, while providing substantial amounts at low cost,
 
are dependent on many factors outside of KNHC's control.
 
The limitations on government and government sponsored
 
funds have previously pointed out in this paper.
 
A continuing supply of capital will be needed as KNHC
 
continues and increases the effectiveness of its efforts.
 
the ones being initiated with AID funds,
Programs such as 

and more lower income families, require
while reaching more 

larger amounts of funding in that they have smaller down­
payments and do not realize a profit.
 
The future success of the KNHC will depend in part
 
on its ability to raise outside funds and remain profitable.
 
Raising outside funds will require efforts to attract money
 
from the orivate sector and foreign investors. Profitability
 
increased efficiency by all
 will result from continuing and 

involved with the corporation.
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Korean National Housing Corporation
 
Table 24: page 87
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TABLE 25
 
Main Housing Construction Accomplishments By Year and Its Selling Price
 
Unit: Thousand Won
 
Housing Built By 
Private Fund or AID Guaranty Loan 
Rental Apt. National Housing Aot. 
By Year By Type 
(Pyong) 
No. of 
Units 
No. of 
Units 
Selling 
Price 
No. of 
Units 
Selling 
Price No. of Units Selling Price 
Average 
Selling Price 
1971 13 300 300 1.270 1,270 
22 748 748 3.190 3,190 
(Heating) 
1972 13 200 200 1,220 1,220 
15 109 109 1,875 1,875 
(Single 
Detached 
House) 
1973 13 1,500 1,500 1,360 1,360 
22 1,490 1,490 (Heating) 
3,600 3.600 
32 420 420 5,525(Heating)1,02,0215 
5,525 
1974 13 4,600 3,600 2,130 1.000 2,200 
2,145 
15 2,700 15 2,700(Heating) 2,700 3.400 3,400 
1975 
32, 
13 
580 
126200 6,000 2,420 
580 5,550 
6,200 2,430 
5,550 
2,425 
15 3,130 3,130 2.850 2,350 
17 2,410 2,410 3,400 
3,400 
to 1974 and national housing is the housing since
 Housing built by private fund is the housing from 1971 

1975.
 
Source: KNHC
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Heuing Constructin Plan by Typ" *n4 Financing Plan in 1976 
Unit: Thousand won 
SUcurtt.v Fund 1011C'iBy Type No. of Construction Governmnt Lottery Housing AID Gurnty 
Loan Entrusted n Pavi'unt For Rentl Own Fund Rewmrie DEscriPtton (PYon) Units Cost Conribution Fund Sond 
I. National 
housing 
2.100.000 8,516.088 Seoul 
Rental Apt. 13 7.000 19.116,088 7.S00.000 1.000.000(33.1) 	 (I1s) (44.6%) and
 
other 
3.537.339
Sale Apt. 5.420 48.851.3 	 10.314.000 
(1.1) 	 (18.91) 
Seoul13 400 1.384.256 735.000 649.2S6 
13 40I.8.26(46.9%) thon. 
heat-
Ing
 
Seoul
16,512
401.000 

(34.9%) (65.11) (heat.
is 270 1.161.512 

Ing 
2.65U.9941.314.000
19 730 3.94.994 

(33.11) 	 (66.91)
 
19.462.607
4.160.000
23 2.280 24.022.601 
 (111) 	 (811) 
15,016.020
3.300.000
25 1.650 18.318.020 
 (181) 	 (821)
 
2. AID 
Quaranty 4.710 12.373.412 7.244.185 5,129,227
 (18.61) (41.4%)

Loan Apt. 

Seoul
566.356
531.233
7.5 S0 1.097.589 
 (46.4".) (51.61) (Heat­
ing) 
Seoul
824.334
811.250
10 600 1.63S.54 
 (Non.(49.6t) (50.4.) 
 heat­ing) 
Seoul8751580
1.130.555
10 840 2.006.13S 
 and
(56.41) (43.61) 
 Masan 
(Hon­
neat­
ing) 
Seoul
4,771.147 2.B62.957
13 2,770 7.634,104 	 and(6Z.S) (37.51) 

other S 
area
 
h.'.1h* 
1.743 4..1 ,714 	 l..I),O0 t35S11000 I'.5I 
11.") (33 30. (54.8%1 
I. gIunoIn 
Intruited 

bV Otiher
 
Iujrncle s 
518.064
 
Veterans 12-13 4s0 1.083.064 	 56S.000 

(5Z.21) 
 (47.8%)
 
1.575.000
Military 15-18 S0O 1.515.00 (1001) 
1353,.194

Kwangju 15-20 635 1,353.194 
 (100%)

11110 

17.472,210
 
Others 

720.480
15-22 158 720.410 
 (100%)
 
4. Latter
 
Half 13 6.090 17,472.210
 
Project 
S. Shopping 2.143,140
400 2.143.140 

Ind
 
Others
 
Stores 15-20 

45,809.756 2.100,000 25,988.298 
TOTAL 26.076 104.687.977 7,500,000 IS61OO 11.889.000 7,244.185 2,591.738 (24.8%)
(7.1%) (1.;%) (11.4%) (6.91) (2.51) (43.71) (21 

"1. Term of financing
 
a. I years grace and 19 years repaymnt with 41 annum.
 
b. Housing bond: 1 year grace and 14 years repayment with 81 per annum.
 
9.5 years grace and 16 years repayment with 9.451,per annum.
 c. AID Guaranty Loan: 

Source: KNC 
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TABLE 28
 
Housing Selling Price 3nd Terms of Mortgage
 
Selling Price (Thousand Won) Monthly Payment (Won) 
Description By Type (Pyong) Total Down Payment Mortgage (%) Grace Period Repayment Period 
1.National 
Housing 
Rental Apt. 13 (2,662-
2,884) 
(2,442 - 2,454) Key Money
(220-430) 
Monthly Rent 
(8,900-12,900) 
Sale Apt. 13 2,825 1,325 1,500 53.1 10,000 19,024 (60 Won 
month will be suc­
cess decreased) 
15 4,302 2,802 1,500 34.9 10,000 19,024 (60 Won per
month will be suc­
cessfully) 
19 5,432 3,632 1,800 33.1 12,000 22,762 (Won per 
month will be 
successfully) 
23 10,837 8,537 2,000 19. 13,334 25,365 (79 Won 
month will be suc­
cessfully de­
creased) 
25 10,855-
11,157 
8,855 - 9,157 2,000 17.9-
18.4 
13,334 25,365 (79 Won 
month will be suc­
cessfully de­
creased) 
2. AID
 
Guaranty
 
Loan Apart­
ment 7.5 2.196 1,133.4 1,062.6 48.4 8,403 10,798
 
(Heating)
 
10 2,374- 735.5-1,373.6 1,207.5- 49.6- 9,549- 12,270 - 17,178
 
(Non-heating) 2,426 1,690.5 69.7 13,368
 
10 2,726 1,373.6 1,352.4 49.6 10,695 13,742
 
(Heating)
 
13 2,579- 647-1.372.6 1,352.4- 49.6 15,278- 13,742 - 19,632
 
(Non-heating) 2,997 1,932 74.9 10,695
 
Terms of Mortgage: a. Rental Apt.: 1 year grace and 19 years repayment with 4%per annum.
 
b. Apt. for sale: 1 year grace and 14 years repayment with 8.per annum.
 
c. AID Guaranty loan Apt.: 9.5 years grace and 16 years repayment with 9.45% per annum.
 
Source: KNHC
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Housing Finance in the Fourth Five Year Plan 
The Korean economy is characterized by a well-developed qovern­
mental system for planning and monitoring econamic developments. 
The Econanic Planning Bureau has developed a fourth five year plan 
for the Korean econamy extending from 1976 through 1981. Substantial 
attention should be given to this plan, in view of the Korean ability 
to set ambitious econcmic targets and to successfully meet these 
targets. In view of the relevance of econcmic planning in Korea 
to actual economic performance, the anticipated allocation of national 
resources to housing provides a necessary beginning for the developlnent 
of a system of financial instruments and institutions. 
The fourth five year plan calls for continued growth in the 
econcmy, with a target of gross national product growth of 17.3% 
per year for the period 1976 through 1981. While this rate of gross 
national product growth is less than that experienced in recent years, 
it is accanpanied by an anticipated reduction in the rate of inflation. 
The fourth five year plan calls for a decrease in the rate of inflation, 
as measured by the GNP price deflator, to an annual rate of 7%per 
year. This strategy is demonstrated in Table 29, which shows gross 
national product for the planning period in 1975 prices. The table 
shows the target rate of growth as 9% per year, roughly consistent 
with the demonstrated long run groth potential in the economy. 
Econamic planners hope to maintain real growth in gross national 
product, while decreasing inflation, by decreasing the rate of growth 
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of money supply. This report has earlier alluded to the practice 
in Korea of pursuing a program involving a rapid growth in the money 
supply. The annual rate of growth of the money stock fram 1970 to 
1975 was 30.9%. The rate of growth projected for the period 1976 
t1rough 1981 is 19.7% per year (Table 30). If this strategy is success­
fully implemented it should result in both a decrease in inflation 
and a lowering of naminal interest rates. The fourth five year plan 
calls for continued moderation of population increases with a five 
year rate of growth anticipated to be 1.6% per year. A result of 
the total economic plan should be a continuation of the relatively 
rapid increase in per capita gross national product over the five 
year period. As real incane in the Korean econamy has increased, 
a sua'ller proportion of the nation's income has been devoted to 
constultion oxejxrditures. In the period from 1960 to 1975, consumption 
exqvnlituros as a pearcent of gross national product have fallcn at 
an annual rate of 1.2% per year. As Table 31 shows, the econanic 
plan calls for continuation and acceleration of this process. The 
table indicates that consumption as a percentage of gross national 
product is expected to fall by approximately 2.6%per year over the 
five year period. The reason for the targeted decrease is the desire 
on the part of economic planners that the Korean economy generate 
greater savings and hence greater investment capital. The continual 
decrease in consumption expenditures may prove difficult to achieve 
over an extended period. 
The targeted decrease in consumption expenditures as a percent 
of gross national product results in a rapid increase in gross private 
damestic savings in the five year plan. As Table 32 shows, econanic 
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plans call for an increase in gross private danestic savings of 15.5% 
per year over the five year period. While the five year plan calls 
for a rapid increase in darestic savingjs, it calls for decreasing 
proportion of these damestic savings to be invested in dwellings. 
Table 33 shows that investment in dwellings as a percent of gross 
private savings will fall fran an expected 1976 rate of 32.84% to 
a rate in 1981 of only 19.86%. Based on the portion of savings allocated 
to housing, the plan shows a significant decrease in the relative 
priority of the housing sector. A similar conclusion results fram 
analysis of gross damestic capital formation and the role of housing 
investment. During the period 1970 to 1975, investment in dwellings 
as a percent of gross danestic capital formation increased 5.3% per 
yer. Under the five year plan as shown in Table 34, investment 
in dwellings as a percent of gross dcmestic capital formation is 
tarqeted to decrease by 3% per year over the five year period. An 
additional evidence of the relative decrease in housing priority 
is provided by Table 35 which shows investment in dwellings as a 
percentage of gross national product and indicates a targeted decrease 
fran 4.5% of gross national product in 1976 to 3.8% in 1981, an average 
rate of decline of 3.3% per year over the period indicated. The 
final evidence of the shift away fram housing investment is provided 
by Table 36 which shows sources of housing finance, divided into 
government and public sector funds and private sector funds. The 
table shows that the increase in public sector housing funds is expected 
to occur at a rate of 9%per year while the increase of private sector 
funds is expected to increase at only 8.2% per year. Both of these 
figures are well below the rate of growth of naminal per capita gross 
-101­
It is further signi­national product and nominal per capita income. 

ficant to note that the plan calls for a more rapid incresase of
 
public sector funds then private stctor funds indicatinq a rolative 
shift away from the private market. 
The final portrait which emerges from our analysis of the fourth
 
five year plan is one of continued rapid economic grcth, an attempt 
to moderate the level of inflation occuring in the Korean economy,
 
emphasis being placed on savings and capital formation and a relative
 
shift away from consumption expenditures. The plan seems to indicate
 
a relative deeuphasis of of housing throughout the period. The
 
implications of this shift away fram housing capital may be serious
 
problems in the developnent of housing finance sources over the coming
 
fivo yca" peril. 
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Development Plan, Economic Planning Bureau, 1976 
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I
GROSS PR- DOEST C VINGS
 
rourth FLve Year PLan
 
0 . 
I1c,J 
SI 
3 713 1979 19B80gs
I976 1977 

years
 
.9"t 11;77 	 197e .
9
,
p9 ige80 
197,' 15. p 
:070 t5.1 	 15.7 t.5.4 
19?0 15.7 	 1,5.6 15. 4 15. 4
 
15.4 15.2 	 15.1 1_4.7: 1$5.5 
AT 1.975 PRICES (BILLION WON)
GPCSS PRIVATE 0O"FSTIC SAVINGS 

1980 
 2479.5$0
1561.20
i97e
1385.50

.;7 6 	 2044,90
19111
2148.501979
1604 .90
1 977 

Source: 	 Major Economic Indicators of the Fourth Five Year Economic
 
Development Plan, Economic Planning Bureau, 1976
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Appendix I
 
Cur!) Market
 
An extensive private financial system known as the
 
"Curb Market" exists in Korea. The system is well known
 
and widely used by citizens, but due to legal measures
 
taken against it by the Korean Government in 1972, there
 
is no official information published. The following dis­
cussion results from comments and opinions of many people.
 
It was emphasized by some that many of their comments
 
concerning the Curb Market were only opinion and not backed
 
by fact.
 
The volume of funds on the Curb Market was reduced
 
substantially after 1972 when measures were taken by the
 
government to outlaw it. Under the Presidential Emergency
 
Decree for Economic Stability and Growth, all Curb Market
 
loans to business firms and the term on those loans ';a
 
to be reported to the National Tax Office by both debtors
 
and creditors. 350 billion won (23% of domestic bank credit
 
in 1972) was reported, with an average interest rate of
 
about 3.5% per month. Operations tend to be more hidden
 
now to avoid paying taxes. Lately, with tight credit,
 
the Curb Market has expanded, but, according to one source,
 
not to the extent of being "threatening to the economy".
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Curb Market capital could amount to 500 billion won or
 
mere.
 
There are about five "sectors" in 
the Curb Market.
 
Thov are, in order of risk 
(from most risky to least),
 
the consumer loan, the kye system, the quasi-financial
 
market, the corporate short term borrowings, and the secondary
 
market for commercial paper. Consumer loans, the most
 
risky, have been known to reach 8% per month. 
Recently
 
loans under 500,000 won are estimated at 4% per month and
 
between 500,000 and 1,000,000 at 3.5% per month. 
In November
 
1976, 
the Chamber of Commerce estimated the average monthly 
rate to be 3.05%. 
The Kye System consists of mutual investment funds
 
or clubs. 
 A group of people bank together and pool their
 
monCv for investment purposes. On these funds they may 
earn as much as 
4% per month. An individual subscribes
 
or 
joins one of these societies normally on a one year
 
basis and will contribute so much per month. 
For example,
 
566 won deposited at the end of each month for 
12 months
 
would mature at 10,000 won at the end of 12 months, providing
 
a rate of interest of 4% per month to the Kye Society member.
 
"Kye Clubs" exist in a legal form as Mutual Investment
 
Companies.
 
The auasi-financial market consists of licensed mutual
 
credit companies and credit unions 
which are not yet licensed.
 
These mutual credit companies are completely legal institutions
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except that they ignore the legal interest ceiling of approx­
imately 25%. Interest rates at these short term financial
 
21. per month on a 3 month dL|pes it.corporations are about 
the Curb Market funds may beSome estimate that 30% of 
in this quasi-financial sector. An example of this type
 
of organization exists at a KDI, a prestigious government
 
research institute. At KDI a type of credit union or mutual
 
fund exists, which pays depositors approximately 2.5% per
 
month and re-lends these funds at 3 to 4% per month.
 
There exists in Korean financial structure about 20
 
illegal brokerage firms who are involved in short term
 
lendinr. Through these brokerage houses, it is possible
 
for corporations to get up to 20 million won at a day's
 
notice. This gives an indication of the volume and the 
These firms have
rapid turnover of funds in these firms. 

a network of agents throughout the cities.
 
The fifth sector is the secondary market for commercial
 
paper. This market is virtually risk free and exists because
 
issuers can't get commercial paper rediscounted at banks.
 
Builders borrow construction money for "spec" homes
 
The fact that they can borrow at 36%
 on the Curb Market. 

for these homes and make money shows that housing costs
 
can be reduced if there are lower interest rates.
 
There is very little default in the Curb Market because
 
the defaulter is put on a blacklist and can't get more
 
credit. If a company defaults on a loan, rumors are spread
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to the effect that the company is in trouble and the credit
 
rating falls.
 
Other factors reducing risk are that homes are sometimes
 
used as collateral and Korean women, although the picture
 
of demure femininity, can reportedly be formidable debt
 
collectors.
 
This highly developed system adjusts interest rates
 
to supply and demand. The base interest rate on the Curb
 
Market is determined by short term corporate borrowings
 
and other rates are risk-adjusted from that base. Interest
 
rates fluctuate daily and are often published in the local
 
newspapers.
 
Interest rates are usually higher in rural areas, 
possibly due to higher risk and handling cost of smaller 
sums of money. Rates are higher around harvest time, as 
demand for funds increases. 
The Curb Market exists for a variety of reasons.
 
In addition to the appeal of high interest rates, the Curb
 
Market requires much less "red tape". Many small businesses
 
and citizens can obtain loans otherwise unavailable to
 
them through the present institutions. Curb Market loans
 
are immediate and not subject to any previous contract
 
savings program. People are also reluctant to give banks
 
title to their collateral as is required in some cases.
 
Depositors in the urban cities would welcome the
 
institutionalization of the Curb Market, but many people
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in the rural areas have a mistrust for financial institutions
 
stemming from a system imposed on them by the Japanese.
 
The Curb Market returns are nominally subject to tax
 
at 25% or at the lender's normal global tax rate, whichever
 
is greater. The borrower is supposed to hold back 25%
 
of interest due and pay it as tax. If the lender's personal
 
income tax rate (global rate) exceeds 25%, he pays the
 
difference. This system is ineffective because if the
 
borrower reports and pays the 25% tax, he will have trouble
 
finding future lenders. 
While the Curb Market is illegal, participants are
 
rarely prosecuted. The government overlooks their operations
 
because they realize that there are many people who need
 
money and cannot ciet credit at the banks. The system is 
il],i'al in that there is a lack of proper ]icensin , and 
a failure to heed interest rate ceilings imposed by the 
government.
 
Suggestions offered to institutionalize Curb Market
 
funds include: (1) contract savings programs with high
 
returns, such as the Salaried and Wage Earners Fortune
 
Formation savings deposit and, (2) a fundamental change
 
in the interest structure.
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Appendix II
 
Summary of
 
Study on Raising of Housing Funds and Housing Finance System
 
Korean National Housing Corporation, 1976
 
Problems
 
I. In meeting the goals of the fourth five year plan,
 
the average yearly volume of housing construction will have to
 
be four times that of the period 1961-1975. This will reauire
 
an investment of 7.5 percent of the total five year year GNP,
 
twice the 3.0 percent previously invested. These funds must
 
be raised by the private sector since the chemical and export 
i.ndustries still claim priority for public funds. 
II. The KHB is beset with problems. It is inadectuate in 
raisina the volume of funds needed for housing finance in Korea.
 
It is the sole bank handling matters related to funds for housing
 
construction.
 
A. 	 National housing bonds and housing debentures
 
are inadequate to meet the housing needs of the
 
fourth five year plan.
 
B. 	 New money raised by the bond will be used to
 
retire old issues.
 
C. 	 Principal on loans outstandina is slow coming in.
 
D. 	 The Bank's role as a financial intermediary is
 
dormant. The Bank is preoccupied with implementinq
 
government policy, not being a financial intermediary.
 
Fund raising activities are conducted from a
 
III. Policy Analysis and Recommendations. Four broad
 
objectives of the Housing policy of the Korean government
 
are: 1) increasing the production of housing units to
 
alleviate the housing shortage, 2) increasing the rate
 
of ownership, and 3) increasing the household savings
 
rates.
 
A. 	Recommendations of this report:
 
1. 	Government should encourage the flow of
 
financial resources into the housing sector.
 
The lack of mortgage funds, and short term
 
development loans to builders, is a very
 
real constraint to housing.
 
2. 	For households unable to support the mortgage
 
payments for a modest (13 pyong) dwelling
 
unit, the government should institute a program
 
of sites and services aside from services to be
 
provided with subsequent repayment by
 
households based on a percentage of income.
 
3. 	National and local government should continue
 
their policy of intervention designed to
 
facilitate the assembly of building sites.
 
IV. Housing Finance for Middle and Upper Income Households
 
A. 	With the exception of small amounts of funds
 
provided by the Korea Housing Bank, mortgage funds
 
are currently unavailable in Korea. However, some
 
short term, high interest rate loans are available
 
in the informal market.
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B. 	 Up to one-half million households might demand
 
housing units if adequate financial arranqements
 
are available. Limitations on demand are:
 
1. 	 Housing units may be excessively modest
 
for middle income families.
 
2. 	Homeless households may have limited ability
 
to aocumulate the required downpayment.
 
3. 	Eligible households may not choose to allocate
 
a major portion of income to housing over a 
long period of time. 
C. 	 Reasons for credit unavailability in the Korean
 
economy:
 
1. 	Uncertainty and financial risk in mortgage loans
 
2. 	 Inexperience of urivnte financial institutions 
with long term mortuaqe loans. 
3. 	Reluctance of government to foster the flow of
 
savings into the housinq sector.
 
D. 	 Solutions for the shortage of housing funds:
 
1. 	Government guarantee against financial loss on
 
loan.
 
2. 	 Implementation of an indexed mortgage with a
 
set real rate of interest and a nominal rate
 
of interest fluctuatiny w.'ith predetermined
 
price indexes.
 
3. 	Korea Housing Bank acting as a secondary mortgage
 
market originating or purchasing mortgages and
 
selling full faith and credit bonds to finance
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these mortgages. Bonds would be indexed and
 
the Korea Housing Bank would stand ready to
 
purchase bonds at any time.
 
4. Korea Housing Bank should get out of the
 
retail lending business leaving this to
 
commercial banks and/or savings banks, leaving
 
the Korea Housing Bank as a wholesale operator
 
in mortgages.
 
5. 	The proscription against construction lending
 
by 	financial institutions should be rescinded.
 
V. 	Middle and Lower Income Housing Financing:
 
A. 	Provision of sites and services
 
B. 	Collection of payments based on the household's
 
ability to pay
 
C. 	Use of minimum subsidies consistent with household
 
ability to pay and provision of housing assistance
 
VI. Operating efficiently in a capital constrained economy
 
A. Two alternatives to operations in a capital short
 
economy:
 
1. 	Shift the mix of constructions programs away
 
from the more capital intensive to the less
 
capital intensive. This could be accomplished
 
by emphasizing the self-help type of housing
 
with substantial labor investment.
 
2. 	Increase in the financial capital efficiency
 
each program; obtain more dwellings with a
 
given amount of financial capital.
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B. 	Only make mortgage loans for new housing units.
 
C. 	Give preference to making loans to units which
 
conserve capital, for example, allow the purchaser
 
to perform some of the finish work.
 
D. 	Continue the practice of assessing a one-time
 
excise tax on large dwelling units.
 
VII. General plan for development of financial institutions
 
A. 	The Korea Housing Bank should become a wholesale
 
mortgage lender and secondary market operation.
 
B. 	Present branches of KHB should become independent
 
institutions of the savings and loan type.
 
VIII. Allocation of capital to housing finance
 
A. 	Amount of capital to be determined by the economic
 
planning board.
 
B. 	The Korean Housing Bank would translate available
 
capital into the implied amount of mortgage funds.
 
C. 	The Korean Housing Bank would sell indexed small
 
denomination debentures to raise the actual mortgage
 
funds. Interest rates would be market determined
 
based on an auction system. These market funds
 
would be channeled mainly to higher income households
 
and to lower income groups after the inclusion of
 
an explicit interest subsidy.
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Appendix III
 
Summary of Korean Housing:
 
Economic Appraisal and Policy Alternatives
 
By: Byung-Nak Song and Raymond J. Struyk
 
May 1976
 
Korean Development Institute
 
I. Demand for new dwellings in urban areas is being
 
stimulated by rising real income and the increasing number
 
of households. Acting in the opposite direction as a deter­
rent of demand is the rising relative price of housing
 
and the shortage of mortgage finance.
 
II. The Korea Housing Bank is the only domestic orcrani­
zation which is directly responsible for raising housing
 
capital and making mortgage loans for housing.
 
A. 	The largest sources of funds for the Korea
 
Housing Bank are National Housing Bonds, savings
 
deposits, loan collections and housing debentures.
 
B. 	Deposits while a major source of funds, are
 
decreasing in importance because of inflation
 
and low rates of interest paid on deposit
 
funds.
 
C. 	Virtually all mortgage interest rates involve
 
subsidy. Only loans to individual households
 
at 15.5% come close to actual market rates.
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Fund raising activities are conducted from a
 
government policy point of view and there is too
 
much emphasis on social welfare and public service
 
aspects of the supportative functions.
 
III. The method of subsidizing housing poses other problems.
 
The present rate of subsidy is too high. Due to the difficulty
 
of identifying the beneficiary of the housing loan, the receivers
 
of this limited subsidy may not be the most needy. Target
 
groups of the subsidy are not clearly defined. The original
 
idea of "support with bank loans" has been degraded into one
 
of "provision of the benefits of bank loans".
 
IV. The existing mortgage market is extremely complex.
 
This is due to the complexity of procedures and the confusing
 
system of subsidizing. Classic banking mechanisms are
 
intntionally blocked making smooth creation and supply of funds
 
to all classes difficult. One consequence is that low income
 
beneficiaries of housing program funds are supplying funds
 
to other low income families.
 
V. A lack of consistent housing development efforts further
 
complicates the situation.
 
VI. Contributing to the underdevelopment of the housing
 
mortgage market is a lack of social stability and mutual trust.
 
Therefore, public institutions must still be used for housing
 
finance.
 
Solutions
 
The more specific solutions stated later all focus on
 
thess broader more general goals that Korea must pursue in
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order to adequately house the populace:
 
Housing Goals
 
I. Increase the percentage of GNP invested in housing
 
from 4 to 7.5%.
 
II. Due to the limited public funds available, efforts
 
should be made to absorb floating private funds and rely
 
on the private sector for housing finance.
 
III. Efforts should be made to maximize both supply
 
and demand for housing.
 
IV. A privately led housing industry should be established
 
with specific subsidies applied where needed and institutionalized
 
government support of that system.
 
V. The groundwork should be laid for a long term, stable
 
supply of huge funds by the establishment of a consistent long
 
range effective mortgage system with due consideration given
 
to its interrelationships with other banking institutions.
 
Specific Solutions
 
I. By differentiating income groups benefiting from the
 
housing program and supplying them with housing funds by
 
different means, specific groups could be selected and provided
 
with specific subsidies. Spontaneous inflows from non beneficiaries
 
could be ensured via general banking mechanixms.
 
II. The Korea Housing Bank could be improved with a number
 
of changes. The government policy implementation function of
 
the bank should be restricted to low income groups. The Bank
 
should be restricted to low income groups. The Bank should
 
become a self-supporting financial intermediary for middle and
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unper income groups followini the nature of a savinqs and 
loan system with preferentia] interest rates on deposits. 
Under such a system, no new agency would be required. All 
persons would be eligible for depositing and there would 
be an affiliation formula to take into account income of 
the depositor and conditions of the deposit. Depositors 
would have priorities on loans. 
Loans would be granted to the builder who would transfer
 
it to the homeowner upon completion of the house. This
 
would serve two purposes: 1) to avoid the misuse of funds,
 
and 2) the granting of loans to private construction companies
 
would enhance their reputation to better enable them to lead
 
the housing industry.
 
Other suggestions for the KHB are:
 
A. 	Equate the loan and deposit rate.
 
B. 	Offset downpayment terms with housing trust and
 
installment money to eliminate inverse interest
 
rates and insure balance in the supply and demand
 
for money.
 
C. 	Establish a secondary market as an additional means
 
of supplying funds.
 
D. 	Use an index tied to income of the borrower in
 
adjusting the maturity of the loan. This would
 
raise or lower the monthly payment, allowing the
 
debt burden of lower income people to match their
 
income.
 
Problems with the above system would be as follows:
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A. 	There would be an initial shortage of working
 
capital.
 
B. 	A readjustment of the overall interest structure
 
in the country would be necessary.
 
C. 
A secondary market would need to be established.
 
D. The bank would operate at a deficit due to equal
 
cost of funds and interest on loans.
 
III. Another solution to the present housing situation
 
would be the encouragement of companies to construct housing
 
for employees. These costs would be written off as 
a loss.
 
This would occur by passing laws requiring companies in
 
industrial estates to construct company housingfirms in
 
cities with adequate finances to house their homeless employees,
 
and requiring other firms to contribute towards a housing
 
construction fund.
 
IV. The effectiveness of the KNHC could be enhanced
 
by its issuance of debentures. The debenture would bear 18.6%
 
to be paid at maturity. Purchasers would be general investors
 
and higher income people who would be given priority in
 
purchasing lots. From an estimated two billion won in proceeds
 
from each issuance, 1,310 individual plots (total area 65,500
= 

pyong) could be developed and sold making KNHC self sufficient
 
in a continuing program of developing and distributing land
 
plots.
 
V. Other recommendations can be summarized as follows:
 
A. 	Introduce a loan issue against housing as collateral.
 
B. 	Improve the housing savings and 
trust systems.
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C. 	Phase out all subsidy policies.
 
D. 	Unify and integrate the mortgage banking system
 
to simplify procedures.
 
E. 	Absorb floating private funds and start a secured
 
mortgage market.
 
-128­
Appendix IV
 
Statistical Appendix
 
Fourth Five Year Plan
 
1. Gross National Product
 
2. GNP Price Deflator
 
3. Population
 
4. Per Capita GNP
 
5. Gross Domestic Capital Formation
 
6. National Investment 	in Dwellings
 
Source for all tables: 	 Major Economic Indicators of the
 
Fourth Five Year Economic Development
 
Plan, Economic Planning Bureau, 1976
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Appendix IV
 
Some Subsidy Considerations for the Korean Economy
 
The existence of housing subsidies is found in many
 
countries ranging from the least developed agrarian societies
 
to the most highly developed industrial nations. The
 
generally stated purpose of such subsidies is to improve
 
the quality of housing in that nation and a broader implied
 
purpose is to improve the .qualitv of life.
 
Housing subsidies do not reduce the national cost
 
of housing. For a given level of housing production, or
 
investment, the economic cost is essentially independent
 
of the existence of a subsidy. The cost of housing is
 
the cost of capital, material and labor resources which
 
are devoted to the housing sector. Subsidy programs may 
redistribute housinq costs among ciroups but they cannot 
reduce these costs. A housing subsidy is a transfer of
 
income to a household for the purpose of providing them
 
housing services greater than that which they could or
 
would consume from their incomes.
 
Housing subsidies, whether to all households or limited
 
to lower income groups, are rooted in the belief that house­
holds will choose a less than optimal level of housing
 
investment and must be induced to purchase greater housing
 
services. The existence of poverty or low income-income
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households does not provide sufficient rationale for housing 
subsidies. The existence of impoverished households within
 
the economy may be a justification for a downward income
 
redistribution, however, it does not justify channelinq
 
redistributed funds directly into housing.
 
A housing subsidy should not qenerally be used in
 
place of an income supplement. Under most circumstances
 
households do not have a "housing problem", they have only
 
an "income" problem. Housing is generally available for
 
those who have the ability to pay. Housing services are
 
inadequate because households do not have sufficient income
 
to afford higher housing standards. Unless it is believed
 
that "special" social benefits derive from housing, households
 
will benefit: more from an unrestricted increase in their
 
income than from being provided housing services of equal 
val ue. 
An example may make this clearer. Assume that a Korean
 
household has an annual income of 800,000 won and that
 
based on its needs for food and other necessities, the
 
household wishes to invest 17 percent of its income in
 
acquiring a housing unit. This household then has an ability
 
to pay 136,000 won per year for its housing services (17
 
percent x 800,000 won). This housing payment will allow
 
the purchase of a unit costing approximately 750,285 won.
l/
 
1/ 750,285 won is the size of a loan which could be paid
 
off with monthly payments payable with 136,000 won per
 
year over a thirty-year period at 18 percent interest.
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If the Korean government is willing and able to provide 
this family with a dwelling costing 1.5 million won, the 
cost in providinq the capital for this unit may be approxi­
mald as 271,900 won per year. 2 / By providing this unit, 
the government has theoretically increased the household's
 
income by 135,900 won per year, or 17 percent, and has
 
substantially increased the amount, and percent, of income
 
used for housing.
 
If, instead of providing the house, the government
 
were to provide the family with an additional 135,900 won
 
per year, the family would have a total spendable income
 
of 935,900 won per year. If the household received this
 
income as cash and if their desire for housing still approxi­
maLottd 17 percenL of income, theil: actual desired housillg 
exj t'lnd i Lure would he 1.59,103 won per annum. This would 
be consistent with a housing unit having a value of 877,740 
won. Thus, the government has placed the family in a home 
having a value approximately 128,000 won greater than that
 
which they would choose if they were given an income rather 
than a housing supplement. By providing a deep housinq
 
subsidy the government has provided more housing services
 
than the individual household wishes to consume given its 
income. 
The provision of direct and deep housing subsidies
 
2/ This is the annual payment necessary to pay off the 
1.5 million won unit at an interest rate of 18 percent 
per year over a thirty-year period.
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results: 
1. 	The development of an uneven housing stock composed
 
of a few units of excessively high physical standard
 
and a great proliferation of substandard units.
 
2. 	Inequitable income distribution between the few
 
households receiving high quality subsidized housing
 
and the many receiving no housing assistance.
 
3. 	Consumption of housing services in excess of those
 
desired by low income assisted families, given
 
their implied total income including what the
 
government provides in a housing subsidy.
 
Subsidies to Stimulate Economic Activity
 
The use of certain subsidies to increase the general
 
level of housing investment in Korea can be supported on
 
economic grounds. Increased housing production may provide
 
jobs ana income that would otherwise not exist. Much of
 
the labor employed in housing construction can be either
 
unskilled or of a skill level which can be achieved by
 
relatively short training periods.
 
InvKorea certain types of housing units can be almost 
entirely constructed using non-strateg ic indigenous materials. 
Housing subsidies which encourage new construction may 
provide increased employment and income and upgrade the
 
quality of housing while having little adverse effect 
on the consumption of strategic materials or the nation's
 
balance of payments. If these goals are to be sought, the 
subsidies used should be specifically tailored to provide
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the 	maximum incentive to the housing industry while using
 
the minimum feasible governmental subsidization and admini­
strative involvement.
 
Methods of Subsidy in the Korean Housing Program
 
A number of direct and indirect housing subsidies
 
exist in the Korean Housing Program. These include the
 
fol owing:
 
1. 	The provision of funds from the Korea Housing

Bank at rates that are below the true cost of
 
long-term capital.
 
2. 	The provision of funds from the Bank of Korea
 
to the Korea Housing Bank at rates that are below
 
the true cost of funds.
 
3. 	Direct government contributions and other government

loans to the Korea National Housing Corporation.
 
Each of the above subsidies can be expressed as one
 
of two major types. The first of these is the interest 
rato, subsidy involving the lending of funds by a qovern­
mentally supported unit at less than the market rate of 
interest. This type of subsidy is provided in the Korean 
Housing Bank. The second general type of subsidy is the
 
capital subsidy which is provided when a housing asset
 
or improvement is provided at less than cost or fair market
 
value. 
Interest Rate Subsidies
 
Interest rate subsidies are commonly used in providing
 
housing in the urban areas of Korea. 
The 	Korea Housing
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Bank makes a variety of 	long term mortgage loans of 
below
 
The subsidy is provided by low
 market interest rates. 

interest loans from the Bank of Korea and forced sale 
of
 
low interest bonds.
 
The amount of government resources involved in providing
 
interest rate subsidies can be substantial. Table 
IV.I
 
shows the monthly subsidy which is involved for a twenty­
year loan of one million won for various levels of 
the
 
actual cost of funds and the rate of interest which 
the
 
For example, if market interest rates
 mortgage loan bears. 

16 percent while the mortgage to the dwelling unit
 are 

interest rate of 8 percent, the monthly
purchaser bore an 

Similarly, if the actual cost
 subsidy would be 5,548 won. 

of money were 18 percent and the rate on the mortgage 
were
 
won
 
14 percent, the monthly subsidy would amount to 2,998 

per one million won of mortgage.
 
as specific
When interest subsidies 	are not accounted for 

amounts, the nation's housing program can be seriously
 
jeopardized by the increasing amount of subsidy required
 
a given size. The subsidy
to maintain a housing program of 

necessary to meet the difference in interest payments continues
 
on a year to year basis during the entire time that the
 
mortgage loan is outstanding. When the housing program
 
is in its fourth year, subsidies are required not only
 
for the production of housing in the fourth year, but to
 
pay the continued subsidy on units completed in the third
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year, second year and first year.
 
Table IV.1
 
MONTHLY SUBSIDY PER I MILLION WON
 
FROM LENDING BELOW TiE COST OF MONEY 
(Assumes 1 million won loan, 20-year maturity) 
Monthly Subsidy in the
 
Interest Rate Actual Cost of Money 
on Mortgage 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
 
8% 1,286 2,646 4,071 5,548 7,069
 
10% 0 1,361 2,785 4,262 5,783
 
12% 0 1,424 2,902 4,422
 
14% 0 1,477 2,998
 
16% 0 1,521
 
18% 0 
Exhibit IV.A shows the yearly subsidy required to 
maintain a lending program of 1,000 loans per year, each 
loan of one million won, assuming that the interest rate 
subsidy is generated by money costing 18 percent which 
is re-lent to the home purchaser at 14 percent. As line
 
A in the exhibit shows, if a constant level of housing
 
production is to be maintained, the required subsidy increases 
each year over the maturity of the loans. For example, 
by the tenth year, the annual subsidy as read from the 
exhibit is approximately 350 million won per year. The 
yearly subsidy would peak under these circumstances in
 
the twentieth year with the annual subsidy level reaching
 
approximately 720 million won.
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EXHIBIT IV.I
 
YEARLY SUBSIDY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT
 
THE GRANTING OF 1,000 LOANS PER YEAR
 
OF 1 MILLION WON
 
(Assumes Cost of Money is 18%, Mortgage Rate 14%,
 
and 20-Year Maturity)
 
Mi] I ion
 
Won
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40O
 
B Provision of funds using tandem 
200 
A = Provision of subsidies based on yearly
 
allocation of funds

15 20 
5 10 15 20 25 3 Years 
* Subsidies are based on the difference in annuity payments 
necessary to pay off one million won loan at 18% versus 14%. 
As a result the pattern is somewhat different than would exist
 
if actual yearly allocations were plotted, however, the
 
implications are identical. 
-144­
The actual impact of a program of this type may be
 
better illustrated by using the exhibit in association
 
with numbers relevant to a possible housing program in
 
Korea. A substantial national program might produce 100,000
 
units a year, each eligible for an interest rate subsidy
 
from an 18 percent cost of funds down to a 14 percent mortgage
 
loan. The mortgage recipient would receive a twenty-year
 
loan of one million won on each unit. 3 / 
The annual subsidy required would be 36,000 won per
 
one million won of loans. The 100,000 units would require
 
an equivalent of 36 billion won for the first year of the
 
program, the annual interest subsidy by the 20th year would
 
amount to 720 billion won per year. In the twentieth year
 
only 36 billion won or 5 percent of the total annual subsidy
 
would be going to support current production. The remaining
 
95 orcent would be required to support subsidies on past 
iprodlucti.on. In each additiona ] year, for at. oaistt he 
f'ir!;L two decades, a smaller and smaller portion of the 
yearly subsidy will be available for current production,
 
while a greater and greater portion will be required to
 
subsidize payments on loans made in previous years.
 
Tandem Program or Discounted Loan Program
 
Interest rate subsidies can be provided which do not
 
3/ The Fourth Housing Plan has a goal of producinq 512,000

public units in the period 1977 to 1981 or an average of over
 
100,000 units per year.
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require annual allocations for subsidizing past production.
 
This is done by providing the subsidy through a one-time
 
original discount on the mortgage. Under this program
 
the lender would provide mortgage funds at the current
 
market interest rate. The mortgage loan would be made
 
at Thea rate determined by the existing subsidy policy. 
mcrtgaqe wouldl hen be valued based on the subsidized rate 
to the home owner. This value would be less than the unpaid 
a result of the subsidy involved.
principal of the mortgage as 

The novernment would then make a one-time payment to the 
lender equal to the difference in value between the subsidized
 
and unsubsidized loan. The original lender would earn
 
in making the
the full interest rate which it agreed to 

loan, the home owner would pay the lower subsidized interest
 
rate and the qovernment would have to provide for the subsidy 
for a qiven unit only once in its hudqet. Exhibit IV.2 
pro\,ikdl,. an example of this proc'ess. 
In the example, the potential home owner has requested 
a loan of one million won at the subsidized interest rate 
of 14 percent. This loan will involve payments of 12,435 
won per month for twenty years. The lender is willing 
to make a loan of this type at an interest rate of 18 percent. 
is derived
The effective interest rate which the lender earns 

from two sources. One is the monthly payment which he 
receives and the second is fees or lump sum payments received 
at the time the loan is originated. In this case , a lump 
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EXI!IBIT IV.2 
TANDEM PLAN FOR
 
SUBSIDIZLD INTEREST RATES
 
T
 
Home Purchaser Applies 
for 1 Million Won Loan 
at 14% Interest
 
20-Year Maturitv
 
V r 
2,435 

Pot. Mont.1h For 20 Years
 
I:t'ec tive Interest Rato
 
of 147, on 1 Million Won Loan 	 Purchaser Granted Loan
 
Monthly Payments of
 
12,435 Wona Per Month
 
for 20 Years
 
l I-, wet, 1\,., :; wcm 	 II 
V 
Tender Peceives Monthly TTT
 
Pa.'vments of 12,435 Won.
 
(T" Time PeO of 1(04,252 Won.
 
londo,1 1- 1 -s on Funcls lender lo,ks lean
' 1,1". 
1.'n If ] Mi ] 1 ifIon h,i ;m l Won. 
.. ... ...... . . .. .. .. .H in i::;t. v ( I*t'I i 	 4 ,'l, ;" Iqonlb 
I[V 
Government Pays
 
One Time Amount 
to Lender of 
794,252 Won
 
Payment necessary to amortize 1 million won loan over 20 years at
 
14% interest.
 
bThw [ paid the oovernment is jus;t sufficient Lo qive the lenderoFee by 
ld of 18 on his loan of I mi]]ion won qiven that paymentr. area y 

based on amortization schedule of ]41.
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w mo i h l a y osu m lIy 11 t tn l l 'oiw onil,'h' i , ,'di h t l i , I 1,.
 
exact I y 1811peceL t effective i n trest rato over tie Iifo 
of the loan. The government wishing to subsidize the home 
purchaser, pays the 194,252 won. The borrower pays an 
effective 14 percent interest rate, the government pays
 
a one-time subsidy payment and the lender earns an effective
 
18 percent return.
 
This method of providing interest rate subsidies does
 
not jeopardize future housing production or subsidy programs. 
No future payments of governmental funds are required to 
support existing units and there is no possibility of the 
program being jeopardized by having insufficient funds 
to support existing units. Line B in Exhibit IV.1 shows
 
the cost of subsidizing 1,000 loans per year using the
 
system.
 
Using this suggested tandem approach the interest
 
rate subsidy becomes equivaleiit to .a one-time capital subsidy.
 
Table IV.2 shows the capital subsidy resulting from a
 
divergence in the actual cost of money and the rate at
 
which money is lent. For example, by going to the table, 
it is shown that if mortgage money is lent at 14 percent
 
when the actual cost of such funds is 18 percent, the implied
 
capital subsidy 194,252 won. This interest rate subsidy
 
is equivalent to a 19.4 percent capital subsidy.
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Table IV.2 
CAPITAL SUBSIDY PER 1 MILLION WON
 
FROM LENDING BELOW THE COST OF MONEY
 
(Assumes 1 million won loan, 
20-year maturity)
 
(000 won)
 
Interest Rate Actual Cost of Money

on Mortgage 10% 
 12% 14% 16% 18%
 
8% 132 240 327 399 458
 
10% 0 124 224 306 375
 
12% 
 0 115 209 287
 
14% 
 0 106 194
 
16% 
 0 98
 
18% 
 0
 
The Ability to Pay and Interest Subsidy
 
In addition to recognizing the total capital subsidy
 
associated with interest rate subsidies the present program 
of providing the same interest rate subsidy to each subsidized 
hou*;eho]d should be reexamined. The present approach to 
interest rate subsidies can be replaced by a program which 
bases the interest rate subsidy on the household's ability
 
to pay. The subsidy based on the ability to pay can be
 
adjusted from time to 
time as the ability to pay changes.
 
Table IV.3 provides a comparison of subsidies based
 
on 
tlhe ability to pay approach and the straight subsidy.
 
The table examines the subsidization of a household purchasing
 
a dwelling unit costing 2.5 million won. 
A downpayment
 
of 60 percent or 1.5 million won is required. The amount
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to be financed is one million won and it is assumed that
 
the basic cost of mortgage money in the unsubsidized market
 
is 18 percent and that a twenty-year term is available.
 
Under the straight interest subsidy, the loan is made to
 
the household using a 14 percent mortgage having a level
 
yearly payment of 149,222 won for the twenty-year period.
 
inder the ability to pay alternative the mortgage payment 
is based on 15 percent of the household income until a
 
maximum interest rate of 18 percent is reached. The example
 
assumes that the original income of the household is 800,000
 
won per year, by 1980 this has risen to one million won
 
and by 1986 that it has risen to 1.2 million won per year.
 
Under the 14 percent mortgage, the payment remains constant
 
over the entire life of the loan. Using the ability to
 
pay approach the original payment is set at 15 percent 
of income or 1.20,000 won per year which provides an oriqinal 
effective interest rate on the loan of 10.32 percent. 
In 1.980 when the household income is reevaluated, the payment 
is raised to 150,000 won per year providing a 14.38 percent
 
effective interest rate on the remaining 16 year loan.
 
In 1986 when the household income is again reevaluated, 
the loan payment is raised to 171,560 won providing an
 
effective interest rate of 18 percent, the same as that
 
existing in the unsubsidized mortgage. This rate continues
 
for the balance of the life of the mortgage. The lower
 
portion of the table shows that in the unsubsidized case, 
the total payments under the loan would be 3,736,400 won.
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Table IV.3
 
INTEREST RATE SUBSIDY
 
STRAIGHT SUBSIDY VERSUS ABILITY TO PAY 
House Price Without Subsidy 2,500,000 Won 
Down Payment 0,60 Percent 1,500,000 Won 
Amount Financed 1,000,000 Won 
Annual Mortgage Payment @ 18 
Percent, 20 Years 186,820 Won
 
Date Income 
Housing 
Budget 
Straight 14% 
Mortgage 
Mortgage Based On 
15% Income 'ax. 
6.5% Rate 
12-76 800,000 120,000 Payment = 150,986 Won Original Payment = 
120,000 Won 
Original Rate + 
10.32% 
12-8 0 1,000,000 150,000 Payment = 150,986 Won Unpaid Bal. = 921,663 
Payment raised to 
150,000; Tntorost1'1. 1?; Rema.i n i n~ 
Matu ri ty - 16 Years 
.12-86 1,200,000 180,000 Payment = 150,986 Won Unpaid Bal. = 771,008 
Payment raised to 
171,560; Interest Rate 
18%; Remaining Mat. = 
10 Years 
COMPARATIVE RESULTS 
No Subsidy 14% Mortgage Variable Subsidy 
Payments Received 20 @ 186,820 20 @ 150,986 4 @ 120,000 
6 @ 150,000 
10 n 171,560 
Total Paynmce~Ls 3,736,400 Won 3,019,720 Won 3,095,600 Won 
Suhs)idy 1.,xpended 0 716,680 640,800 Won 
Units Supported per 
1,000,000 Won Subsidy --- 1.4 1.6 
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Under the variable subsidy, 3,095,600 won is collected
 
and the subsidy amounts to 640,800 won. The final line
 
in the exhibit shows that per one million won, of public 
funds available, only 1.4 unit s could he supported under 
the straight subsidy, while under the subsidy based on 
the ability to pay, one million won would support 1.6 housing 
units. In the example the modified plan w¢ould support 
14 percent more units than the straight subsidy program. 
Minimization of Subsidy and Recovery of Subsidy Payments
 
Deep interest rates subsidies are granted to nearly
 
all individuals able to obtain loans from the Korea Housing
 
Bank or Korean National Housing Corporation.
 
Because of the present subsidies involved per unit, 
it is not po.;'ib)1L for Korea t:o provide housing of the 
presently produced size and quality for a significant portion 
of the population. By appropriate modification to the
 
subsidy programs, more housing can be produced with the
 
available public and private resources available in the
 
nation. A modified program should be based on the following
 
principles:
 
1. Housing subsidy should not be used as a general
 
income supplement. 
2. 	 1louseholds should recoqnize the cost of housinq 
serv.ices and be give incentives to conserve these 
resources. 
3. 	 Subsidies should be limited to the difference 
between the ability to pay and the minimum quality 
housing unit which the government is willing to 
advocate for a given household. 
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